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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES 
There are no related cases. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78A-3-102 (3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-3-102(4). The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
Appellants Victor Lawrence ("Mr. Lawrence") and Cindy Lawrence ("Ms. 
Lawrence") (collectively, the "Lawrences") were married during the times relevant to this 
action but have since divorced. Although Ms. Lawrence has remarried and changed her 
name, this brief will refer to her as "Ms. Lawrence" for the sake of convenience. 
Appellee is Intermountain, Inc. ("Intermountain"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
• Whether the trial court erred in finding the Lawrences liable for conspiracy 
to defraud, while simultaneously finding Intermountain failed to prove the Lawrences 
committed fraud where the trial court could not "identify any affirmative 
misrepresentations made directly by Mr. [or Ms.] Lawrence to Intermountain." (R. 2578). 
• Whether the trial court erred in basing its finding that Ms. Lawrence had 
requisite knowledge of a conspiracy entirely on a judicial admission, where Ms. Lawrence 
had no actual knowledge, did not retain the attorney who made any judicial admission, 
did not know of or review the complaint in which was found the claimed judicial 
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admission, and only ratified, if at all, "the cause of action ... asserted," but not any 
particular factual allegation in the complaint. (R. 2578). 
• Whether the trial court erred in imputing knowledge of any alleged scheme 
to Mr. Lawrence based upon his marriage and cohabitation with Ms. Lawrence. 
• Whether the trial court erred in holding the Lawrences liable for conversion 
and determining the period of conversion, when Intermountain lacked any right to 
possession of the vehicle before January 31, 2001, and the Lawrences did not have 
possession of the vehicle after that date. 
• Whether the punitive damages awarded by the trial court were in excess of 
the constitutional limits set forth in State Farm Ins, Co, v, Campbell and the principles set 
forth in Crooks ton v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellate court reviews the district court's findings of fact for clear error and 
conclusions of law de novo. See Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 846 (Utah 2004). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution: "... No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law...." 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(Course of Proceedings, Disposition in Trial Court) 
The Lawrences' appeal is from the trial court's written Findings of Fact ("FF") and 
Conclusions of Law ("CL") (Addendum "A") following a four-day bench trial, entered on 
August 13, 2007, finding the Lawrences liable for conspiracy to defraud and conversion, 
and from the trial court's Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment ("SF") (Addendum "B") following a two-day bench trial on punitive damages, 
entered on June 25, 2008, awarding punitive damages against the Lawrences. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Intermountain, Inc. is a licensed motor vehicle dealer and Isuzu 
franchisee. (FF ][2.) 
2. A. Paul Schwenke ("Mr. Schwenke") was a business client of Mr. 
Lawrence, an attorney, who established a business entity named cSave.net, LLC 
("cSave.net" or the "LLC"). On November 4, 1999, Mr. Lawrence prepared Articles of 
Organization and an Operating Agreement for cSave.net. Wayne Wong ("Mr. Wong") 
was a managing member of the LLC. (FF, ffl[ 3-4.) 
3. On or about March 2000, Mr. Schwenke determined to lease certain 
vehicles for personal use by his wife Wilma and his daughter Tania. According to Mr. 
Lawrence, Mr. Schwenke also intended to lease a vehicle for the Lawrences' personal 
use as partial payment for legal services rendered by Mr. Lawrence. (FF, ^6). 
4. On March 29, 2000, Mr. Schwenke sent, on cSave.net letterhead, an 
inquiry to Intermountain regarding leasing three vehicles. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 10, 
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hereinafter "Ex.," attached hereto as Addendum "C"). 
5. Only Mr. Wong signed the leases for the three vehicles on or about 
March 31, 2000. Mr. Schwenke was present when the three leases were signed. (FF, 
118,11)-
6. Part of the information Mr. Schwenke and Mr. Wong gave to 
Intermountain in applying for the three leases was cSave.net's application for an 
employer identification number. (Trial Transcript, Volume I., p.29, lines 1-8, 
hereinafter "Trans., Vol.") (Relevant portions of the Trans, are attached hereto as 
Addendum "D," see also Ex. No. 15, attached as Addendum "E"). 
7. Mr. Schwenke agreed to pay Mr. Wong $10,000 to sign the leases. (FF, 
18)-1 
8. Mr. Lawrence issued a personal check to Intermountain to cover the 
down payment for each of the three vehicles. Mr. Lawrence was subsequently 
reimbursed by Mr. Schwenke for that expenditure. (FF, ^ 12) (Trans. Vol. IV, p. 359). 
9. Following Mr. Wong's signing of the leases, the Lawrences took 
possession of a black Isuzu Rodeo (the "Black Rodeo"). (FF, Tfl9). Two other Isuzu 
Rodeos (the "Green Rodeo" and the "Silver Rodeo") were possessed by Mr. 
Schwenke's wife and daughter. The Lawrences never had possession of the Green and 
1
 The trial court found the plaintiffs in the underlying action, including Ms. Lawrence, had 
knowledge of the $10,000 payment to Mr. Wong. (FF, [^8). The trial court imputed that 
knowledge to Ms. Lawrence because of a judicial admission. (FF, f9). The trial court also 
imputed knowledge to Mr. Lawrence because he was married to Ms. Lawrence. As argued 
herein, Ms. Lawrence did not have actual knowledge of any inducement, did not commit an 
unlawful act and the trial court should not have found a judicial admission. Further, any 
knowledge by Ms. Lawrence may not be imputed to Mr. Lawrence solely by their marriage. 
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Silver Rodeos. (FF,1fl9). 
10. When they took possession, Mr. and Ms. Lawrence understood the 
leases would be paid for by cSave.net. (Trans., Vol. I, p. 193, lines 20 & 21; Trans., 
Vol. I, p. 194, line 20 through p., 195, line5 ; Trans., Vol. I, p. 199, lines 9 -17; & 
Trans., Vol. II, p. 220, lines 1-6). 
11. Intermountain sold the lease for the Silver and Green Rodeos to Isuzu 
Motors Acceptance Corporation. (FF, ^ f 20). 
12. Intermountain sold the lease for the Black Rodeo to Bank of America, 
NA.(FF,1f20). 
13. Neither cSave.net nor Mr. Wong made any payments on the leases. (FF, 
11121,24). 
14. A complaint (the "Complaint) was filed against Intermountain for 
breach of contract. (R. 1). 
15. On January 31, 2001, Bank of America assigned all of its rights, title 
and interest in the Black Rodeo to Intermountain in exchange for $35,278.24 -
$28,974.24 representing the vehicle pay off and $6,331 in attorney fees and costs. (FF, 
1125). 
16. Intermountain repurchased the Black Rodeo on January 31, 2001 from 
Bank of America, N.A. (FF, <|fl[ 25, 28; see also Ex. 61, attached hereto as Addendum 
"F"). 
2
 The Complaint names Ms. Lawrence as a Plaintiff. As set forth below, Ms. Lawrence had no 
knowledge the Complaint had been filed. She did not retain the attorney who filed it, let alone 
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17. On January 31, 2001, the same day Intermountain repurchased the lease, 
Intermountain tried to repossess the Black Rodeo. Mr. Lawrence intervened and said he 
would not turn over the vehicle without a court order. After being called to the scene, 
the police allowed Mr. Lawrence to leave the scene with the Black Rodeo. (FF, ^|28). 
18. Immediately after the attempted repossession, Mr. Lawrence turned the 
Black Rodeo over to Mr. Schwenke because he understood cSave.net, of whom Mr. 
Schwenke was the owner, to be the lessee of the vehicle. (FF, f 29, Trans., Vol. II, p. 
229, lines 1-20). 
19. Intermountain obtained a writ and order of replevin on the Black Rodeo 
on October 5, 2001. (Ex. 81). 
20. Mr. Schwenke returned the Black Rodeo to Intermountain in 2002. 
When Mr. Schwenke returned the vehicle, it had been totaled in an accident (FF, ^34). 
21. The trial court found the Lawrences were not liable for fraud, because 
the trial court could not "identify any affirmative misrepresentations made directly by 
Mr. [or Ms.] Lawrence to Intermountain," but were liable for conspiracy to defraud 
and for conversion. (CL, ^j 59, 61 & 65). 
22. The trial court calculated Intermountain's monetary damages as 
follows: Intermountain paid $32,202.08 to repurchase the lease on the Silver Rodeo, 
and $28,272.13 to repurchase the lease on the Green Rodeo. (FF, f 23). Intermountain 
was required to repurchase the lease on the Black Rodeo for $35,278.24, including 
attorneys fees and costs. (FF, % 25). The total amount Intermountain expended to 
review it before filing. 
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repurchase the three Rodeos was $95,752.45. (FF, f 35). The trial court added $8,000 
in expenses, then subtracted out $23,408.98 (the amount for which Intermountain 
resold the three vehicles) to reach a net loss of $80,412.87. (FF, p5).3 
23. The trial court found the Lawrences jointly and severally liable for 
conspiracy to defraud in the amount of $80,412.87. (CL, ^ f 69). 
24. The trial court found the Lawrences jointly and severally liable for 
conversion of the Black Rodeo from April 1, 2000, until January 31, 2001, in the 
amount of $3,625.40, plus prejudgment interest. (CL, f^ 69). 
25. The trial court also found Mr. Lawrence separately liable for 
conversion of the Black Rodeo from April 1, 2000, until July 10, 2003, in the amount 
of $34,282.20, plus prejudgment interest. (CL, ffij 66, 69). 
26. The trial court found Mr. Lawrence's conduct caused Intermountain to 
sustain financial damages that, with prejudgment interest, amounted to $138,267.25 as 
of August 13, 2007. The court concluded that punitive damages, to be awarded in 
favor of Intermountain and against Mr. Lawrence, should be in the amount of 
$484,000. (SF, p. 37). 
27. The trial court found Ms. Lawrence's conduct caused Intermountain to 
sustain financial damages that, with prejudgment interest, amounted to $138,267.25 as 
of August 13, 2007. The court concluded that punitive damages, to be awarded in 
favor of Intermountain and against Ms. Lawrence, should be in the amount of 
$99,999.99. (SF,p.41). 
3
 The trial court's calculation is off by $69.40. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court found the Lawrences liable for conspiracy to defraud despite 
finding no liability for direct fraud. The trial court could not "identify any affirmative 
misrepresentations made directly by Mr. [or Ms.] Lawrence to Intermountain." (FF, fflf 
60, 64). In order to be liable for conspiracy to defraud, the plaintiff must prove all the 
elements of the underlying fraud. Because Intermountain failed to prove the Lawrences 
liable for direct fraud, the conspiracy to defraud ruling should be reversed as a matter of 
law. There were no unlawful, fraudulent acts directly committed by the Lawrences and a 
finding of fraud against a codefendant cannot be imputed to them. 
The trial court erred in imputing knowledge of a conspiracy to Ms. Lawrence on 
the basis of a judicial admission, when the uncontroverted evidence at trial showed Ms. 
Lawrence had no actual knowledge of a conspiracy, and where any judicial admission, if 
one is found, relates only to ratification of the "cause of action" asserted, not as to any 
particular factual allegation. Further, the trial court erred in imputing knowledge of a 
conspiracy to Mr. Lawrence by reason of his marriage to and cohabitation with Ms. 
Lawrence. 
Despite only having possession of the Black Rodeo for a period of 10 months, the 
trial court found Mr. Lawrence liable for conversion for a period of years, including time 
when the vehicle was in possession of other persons. Further, the trial court erroneously 
found the Lawrences liable for conversion months before Intermountain had any right to 
this vehicle, which was not assigned by Bank America until January 31, 2001, and 
months before Intermountain obtained a writ of replevin. 
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Finally, the trial court entered punitive damages against the Lawrences for 
Intermountain's loss of three vehicles, even though they only had possession of one of 
those vehicles for a period of 10 months. The trial court's punitive damage award also 
exceeds the constitutional limits set forth in State Farm Ins. Co. v. Campbell and the 
principles set forth in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange for the following reasons, among 
others: the trial court included pre-judgment interest and attorney fees to determine the 
amount of punitive damages; the punitive damage award could not be based on 
conspiracy to defraud because the trial court erred in finding the Lawrences liable for 
such a conspiracy; and the amount of time the Lawrences could be liable for any 
conversion was erroneously determined. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. UTAH LAW PRECLUDES FINDING A PARTY CONSPIRED TO 
DEFRAUD WHERE THE ELEMENTS OF THE UNDERLYING FRAUD ARE 
NOT PROVEN 
A. Conspiracy to Defraud Requires Proof of the Underlying Fraud 
The Utah Supreme Court has held "conspiracy to defraud requires proof of the 
underlying fraud." Gildea v. Guardian Title, 970 P.2d 1265, 1271 (Utah 1998). Under 
Utah law, conspiracy to defraud is defined as "fraud committed by two or more persons 
who share an intent to defraud another." DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1358 
(Utah 1994). In order to prevail on a claim of conspiracy to commit fraud, the plaintiff 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of fraud. Gildea, 970 P.2d at 
1271. An action for conspiracy to defraud falls within the ambit of secondary claims that 
require proof of the underlying tort. See Colores v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 983 (Utah Ct. 
13 
App. 2003) (holding that in order to sufficiently plead a secondary claim based on fraud, a 
plaintiff needs to sufficiently plead fraud). 
Here, the trial court stated, with respect to both Lawrences, "the Court cannot 
conclude that Intermountain established by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. [or 
Ms.] Lawrence's actions satisfy the elements of fraud." The trial court could not 
"identify any affirmative misrepresentation made directly by Mr. [or Ms.] Lawrence to 
Intermountain." CL, fflf 60 & 63. Despite these conclusions, the trial court determined 
the Lawrences are liable for conspiracy to defraud. See CL, 1fl[ 61 & 65 ("Although the 
Court does not hold that Mr. [and Ms.] Lawrence directly committed fraud, the Court 
concludes that Mr. [and Ms.] Lawrence conspired to defraud Intermountain"). Such a 
finding is inconsistent with Utah law requiring the establishment of the elements of fraud 
in order to find a conspiracy to defraud. Gildea, 970 P.2d at 1271. Because 
Intermountain failed to establish the Lawrences committed civil fraud, the trial court was 
precluded from finding the Lawrences were liable for conspiracy to commit fraud and 
such finding should be reversed. 
B. Conspiracy to defraud requires overt participation in the primary fraud 
The trial court found Mr. Wong liable for fraud because he knowingly made 
material misrepresentations to Intermountain, including: (a) signing the leases for the 
three Rodeos as the lessee with no intention of making any payments on the vehicles; (b) 
committing to maintain insurance with no intention of doing so; (c) agreeing to terms that 
obligated him to maintain control of the vehicle when he had no intention to do so; and 
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(d) failing to disclose that he was promised $10,000 in exchange for his signature on the 
leases. (CL,1J54). 
The trial court did not find either Mr. or Ms. Lawrence participated in any of these 
misrepresentation. To the contrary, the trial court stated it could not find any affirmative 
misrepresentations made directly by the Lawrences to Intermountain and, for that reason, 
could not find the Lawrences liable for fraud. (CL, ^f 60 & 64). Further, none of the acts 
by the Lawrences, as discussed more fully below, related to Mr. Wong's overt acts, which 
were made when he executed the leases. These acts were not material to the formation of 
any conspiracy. 
The trial court, nevertheless, found the Lawrences liable for conspiracy to defraud, 
although their acts were committed at times other than the execution of leases. The trial 
court, CL ^[ 59, 61 & 65, found the Lawrences liable for conspiracy to commit fraud 
based only on the following: 
1. With respect to Ms. Lawrence: 
a. Approximately one month before Ms. Lawrence obtained possession of the 
Black Rodeo, West Valley Dodge repossessed a Durango from the 
Lawrences that had been leased by Mr. Schwenke under a similar 
arrangement. (CL, Tf 61). 
To suggest the filing of the West Valley Dodge case merits a finding that there was 
a pattern of filing claims against automobile dealers by Ms. Lawrence in order to receive 
a vehicle for use and not pay for it is pure conjecture and speculation, contrary to the 
instructions of Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
("The evidence must do more than merely raise a suspicion-it must lead to belief that the 
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conspiracy existed."). The West Valley Dodge complaint is for unlawful repossession, 
not breach of contract, as in the instant case. There is no evidence in the record of a 
"similar arrangement." Further, even assuming the West Valley Dodge case was 
frivolous, of which there is no probative evidence, it is not unlawful. The filing of a 
frivolous claim is not a form of fraud. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265, 1270 
(Utah 1998). In the words of Judge Posner, "[S]ince when is a frivolous claim a form of 
fraud?" Oxxford Clothes XXv. Expeditors Intern, 127 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 1997). 
b. Ms. Lawrence participated in the $10,000 offered to Mr. Wong to induce 
him to sign the leases from which she would benefit by receiving and using 
one of the vehicles. (CL, f 61). 
The trial court based this conclusion entirely on a judicial admission by Ms. 
Lawrence found in the Complaint she had never read, prepared by an attorney she never 
retained. As argued below, the trial court erred in relying on a judicial admission. Even 
if the judicial admission stands, there is nothing unlawful about paying someone to be a 
credit facilitator in a lease transaction. The trial stated it could not "conclude that Ms. 
Lawrence had an affirmative duty to disclose that inducement to Intermountain, or that 
her failure to disclose the inducement constituted a misrepresentation by material 
omission." (FF,^60,n. 15). 
c. Ms. Lawrence was present at the time the leases were negotiated and 
signed, and she was generally aware of the anticipated financial terms. (CL, 
161) 
Ms. Lawrence was not a signatory to the lease and was not bound by the terms 
thereof. Non-parties to a contract cannot be bound by the terms thereof. See, e.g., 
Metropolitan Alloys Corp. v. State Metals Indus., Inc., 416 F.Supp. 561 (E.D. Mich. 
16 
2006). Likewise, Ms. Lawrence's general awareness of the payment terms was not 
unlawful and did not bind her to the lease. 
d. Ms. Lawrence took possession of the Black Rodeo with no intention or 
expectation of making any payments on the vehicle, nor did she make any 
effort to ensure payments would be made. (CL, f 61). 
Again, Ms. Lawrence was not a signatory to the lease and was not contractually 
bound to make payments. She neither had a duty to make the payments nor to ensure 
payments were made. Although she had possession of a vehicle, she understood 
cSave.net to be making payments. (Trans., Vol. I. Page 199, lines 10-12). 
e. Ms. Lawrence lent her name to a lawsuit designed to impede 
Intermountain's efforts to recover the vehicle she was using without lawful 
claim. (CL,t61). 
Ms. Lawrence did not know a lawsuit had been filed on her behalf and did not 
retain the attorney who filed the lawsuit. (Trans., Vol. I, p. 195, lines 11-14, Vol. III. p. 
342, lines 3-5). Even if the lawsuit was frivolous, it was not unlawful, as Judge Posner 
noted. Oxxford Clothes XX, 127 F.3d at 577 (7th Cir. 1997). As soon as the Lawrences 
learned Intermountain was attempting repossession of the vehicle, Mr. Lawrence returned 
it to Mr. Schwenke, owner of cSave.net, the company he understood had leased the 
vehicle. (CL, [^66). There is nothing unlawful in this conduct. 
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2. With respect to Mr. Lawrence: 
a. Approximately one month before Mr. Lawrence obtained possession of the 
Black Rodeo, West Valley Dodge repossessed a Durango from the 
Lawrences that had been leased by Mr. Schwenke under a similar 
arrangement. (CL, Tf64). 
See foregoing response to subsection (a) of the trial court's finding with respect to 
Ms. Lawrence. 
b. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lawrence assisted Mr. Schwenke in his efforts to 
secure a new vehicle by contacting a Bountiful dealership, and attempting 
to negotiate a new set of leases. (CL, f^ 64). 
There is nothing unlawful in these actions. "Common sense and reason dictate that 
evil inferences should not be permitted to be drawn from routine business transactions 
where there are no other transactions. To hold otherwise would throw the door open for 
an attack on each and every transaction that one might enter into." Holland v. Columbia 
Iron Mining Co., 293 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1956). If the object of the alleged conspiracy 
or the means used to attain it is lawful, even if the damage results to plaintiff or defendant 
acted with malicious motive, there can be no civil action for conspiracy. "If such were 
not the rule, obviously many purely business dealings would give rise to an action in tort 
on behalf of one who may have been adversely affected." Gildea, 970 P.2d at 790 
(internal citation omitted). 
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c. Mr. Lawrence was present at the negotiations the day Mr. Wong signed the 
leases and knew the general financial terms of the leases. Mr. Lawrence 
even testified at one point he told Mr. Schwenke to go back to the Bountiful 
dealership if Intermountain could not meet the terms offered by that 
dealership. (CL,H64). 
There is nothing unlawful in the above actions. Again, participation in routine 
business dealings cannot form the basis for liability for civil conspiracy. Holland, 293 
P.2d at 702; Gildea, 970 P.2d at 790. 
d. Mr. Lawrence provided the down payment for each of the three Rodeos. 
(CL, 1| 64). 
Intermountain accepted down payments from Mr. Lawrence, who was not the 
lessee. There is nothing unlawful in this action. Holland, 293 P.2d at 702. Also, it 
undercuts Intermountain's argument it would not have leased the vehicles to Mr. Wong if 
it thought someone else was going to drive the vehicles. Mr. Wong leased three vehicles. 
Intermountain knew or should have known others were going to drive at least two of 
those vehicles. 
e. Mr. Lawrence took possession of the Black Rodeo with no intent or 
expectation to pay for the vehicle, and without ensuring that payment would 
be made. (CL, ^ 64). 
See foregoing response to subsection (d) of the trial court's finding with respect to 
Ms. Lawrence. 
f. Because Mr. and Ms. Lawrence were married and cohabiting at the time 
Ms. Lawrence participated in the inducement to Mr. Wong, it is reasonable 
to infer that Mr. Lawrence was also aware of that inducement. (CL, % 64). 
The trial court's holding of "guilt by association" subjects husbands and wives 
everywhere to liability for the unlawful acts of their spouses. As argued below, such a 
19 
holding is contrary to established law. Also, because Ms. Lawrence did not have 
knowledge of any inducement to Mr. Wong at the time of the leases, she could not have 
imparted that knowledge to Mr. Lawrence. 
C. Mr. Wong's Liability for fraud cannot serve as the basis for finding the 
Lawrences conspired to defraud 
Although another party in this matter, Mr. Wong, was found liable for fraud, his 
fraud cannot serve as the basis for finding the Lawrences conspired to defraud. In order 
to find the Lawrences liable for conspiracy to defraud, the trial court must find the 
elements of fraud were met with respect to the Lawrences themselves, and not with 
respect to a co-defendant. See Debry, 879 P.2d at 1358 ("A conspiracy to defraud is 
fraud committed by two or more persons who share an intent to defraud another") 
(emphasis added). If neither Lawrence committed a fraud because, among other 
elements, they made no affirmative misrepresentation, they cannot be found liable for 
conspiracy to defraud, even if Mr. Wong was found to have committed civil fraud. Stated 
differently, the gist of conspiracy is the agreement. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 
U.S. 640 (1948). There is no evidence the Lawrences entered into any agreement with 
Mr. Wong, whether it was for Mr. Wong not to pay for the leases, maintain insurance or 
otherwise. There is no evidence the Lawrences ever even spoke with Mr. Wong. 
Intermountain acknowledged at trial its claim for conspiracy to defraud was not 
aimed at Ms. Lawrence. Counsel for Intermountain stated, during the course of arguing 
the Lawrences' motion to dismiss after the close of Plaintiff s evidence, "There is also a 
conspiring to defraud ... and that really goes more to [Mr. Lawrence] than it does to [Ms. 
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Lawrence]. We'll concede that fact." (Trans., Vol. II, p. 293, lines 12-14; Addendum 
"D"). This underscores Intermountain's claims against the Lawrences were derivative of 
direct fraud committed by others. Such secondary claims cannot be proved without 
proving the underlying fraud.4 
This case, then, is similar to Colores in the following respect. In Colores, the 
court stated: 
Our affirmance of the dismissal of this claim, at least as against the Ganter 
defendants, should come as no surprise to Plaintiffs. At oral argument, Plaintiffs1 
counsel stated Plaintiffs' position as follows: "For the most part, this is not a case 
based upon the Ganter defendants1 direct liability or participation directly in these 
frauds. Rather, their liability is based upon principles of secondary liability as 
control persons under Utah securities laws as well as conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting principles." Counsel went on to say that it was principally Mr. Degenhardt 
who had committed the primary fraud offenses. 
The court's reasoning should have come as no surprise in that case, then, because the 
Plaintiffs themselves acknowledged, at least with respect to the Ganter defendants, the 
case was about an alleged secondary fraud, not a primary fraud. The court in Colores, 
thus, was bound to dismiss the secondary claims, at least as against the Ganter defendants, 
as not having a basis in an underlying tort, even where there was an allegation of fraud 
against a separate defendant. Similarly, here, Intermountain's counsel acknowledged the 
claim for conspiracy went more to Mr. Lawrence than Ms. Lawrence. Further, no direct 
fraud was entered against either Mr. Lawrence or Ms. Lawrence. The conspiracy finding 
cannot be upheld. 
4
 The elements of a judicial admission are discussed more fully below. However, if Ms. 
Lawrence is bound by a judicial admission, then Intermountain should also be bound by 
this judicial admission, thereby relieving Ms. Lawrence from any liability for a conspiracy 
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This point was apparently recognized by Intermountain at the end of the trial when 
it brought a motion to amend the pleadings to bring a claim against the Lawrences for 
aiding and abetting fraud. See CL, f^ 63. During closing argument, counsel for 
Intermountain set forth the elements of aiding and abetting fraud and then moved to 
amend Intermountain's complaint to add the claim. The claim of aiding and abetting 
fraud would not require Intermountain to prove the Lawrences committed the underlying 
tort, but only that they had knowledge of it. There are no Utah cases recognizing this 
tort.5 Courts adopting this cause of action recognize three elements of aiding and abetting 
fraud: (1) the existence of a fraud; (2) a defendant's knowledge of the fraud; and (3) that 
the defendant provided substantial assistance to advance the fraud's commission. See, 
e.g., JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Winnick, 406 F.Supp. 2d 247, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
The distinction, then, between "conspiracy to defraud" and "aiding and abetting 
fraud" is a defendant must have been an active participant in the fraud in order to be 
found liable for conspiracy, whereas a defendant may be found liable for aiding and 
abetting based merely on knowledge of the underlying fraud and some sort of assistance. 
Intermountain thus recognized finding the Lawrences liable for conspiracy to defraud 
would require overt participation in the fraud, and aiding and abetting fraud would not 
require overt participation. Intermountain's counsel stated during closing argument: 
I would hope the Court finds that both Cindy and Victor Lawrence were overt 
participants in the fraud, but an alternative finding that even if Victor Lawrence 
to defraud. 
5
 In Colores, the Court declined to address the question of whether aiding and abetting fraud is a 
cognizable claim under Utah law. 
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did not overtly participate in the fraud, he very clearly aided and abetted it, and 
therefore would be liable." (Trans., Vol. IV, p.490, lines 1-6). 
The trial court denied Intermountain's motion to amend its Complaint to add a 
claim for aiding and abetting fraud. See CL, ^ 63. Intermountain was, therefore, required 
to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Lawrences directly committed fraud. 
A finding of fraud is a necessary condition for a finding of conspiracy to defraud. The 
Lawrences were found not liable for fraud and therefore cannot be found liable for 
conspiracy to defraud and such findings should be reversed. 
POINT 2. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING MS. LAWRENCE 
LIABLE FOR CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD WHEN HER 'KNOWLEDGE' OF 
THE CONSPIRACY WAS ERRONEOUSLY BASED ON A JUDICIAL 
ADMISSION, AND WHERE THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY INDICATES SHE HAD 
NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
The trial court's finding Ms. Lawrence knew of Mr. Wong's fraud is based upon a 
single found conclusion: a claimed judicial admission she knew of the payment of a 
$10,000.00 inducement to Mr. Wong. Ms. Lawrence repeatedly testified she did not 
retain the attorney who filed the Complaint (Trans., Vol. I, p. 195, lines 12-14; Vol. III. 
Page 342, lines 3-5); did not know she was a party in the case (Trans., Vol. III. p. 342, 
lines 11-12); did not authorize a complaint to be filed in her behalf (Trans., Vol. I, p. 195, 
lines 18-20; Vol. III. p. 342, lines 13-15); did not have any input with respect to 
interrogatories (Trans., Vol. III. p. 342, lines 21-23); did not negotiate the leases (Trans., 
Vol. III. p. 343, lines 1-9); and did not know who Mr. Wong was on the day the leases 
were signed or on the day the Complaint was filed. (Trans., Vol. III. p. 343, lines 15-23). 
Ms. Lawrence's lack of actual knowledge of any inducement to Mr. Wong or any scheme 
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was undisputed in the trial court. Rather, her "knowledge" was ascribed to her on the 
basis of an allegation in the Complaint that she had not read nor even knew was filed. 
Ms. Lawrence was asked at her deposition: 
So even though you have never seen this complaint before as testified, this would 
have been the cause of action you would have asserted and in fact would have 
supported and consented for; is that correct? (Trans., Vol. III., p. 349, lines 18-25) 
(reading deposition transcript into the record) (emphasis added). 
Ms. Lawrence replied "Yes." (Id.) 
The "cause of action" to which she would have assented had she known about it 
was a breach of contract action against Intermountain. She did not give ratification to 
each specific factual allegation in the Complaint, but only to the cause of action, z.e, that 
"matter for which an action may be brought." Cantonwine v. Fehling, 582 P.2d 592, 596 
(Wyo. 1978). Ms. Lawrence did not ratify the allegation in paragraph 41 of the 
Complaint Mr. Wong was promised $10,000 to sign the leases. She did not know about 
the inducement. 
Nevetheless, the trial court found as follows: 
At paragraph 41 of the complaint that initiated this case, Ms. Lawrence, as one of 
the plaintiffs, stated: "[I]n order to induce plaintiff Wayne Wong to sign on the 
leases, plaintiffs agreed to pay him $10,000.00." See [Addendum F]. 
Notwithstanding this judicial admission, at trial Ms. Lawrence denied any 
knowledge of, or participation in, the payment offered to Mr. Wong. Although 
there was disputed evidence concerning when Ms. Lawrence actually saw the 
complaint in which she participated as a plaintiff, it is clear that at her deposition 
in 2002 she ratified the claims of the original complaint without qualification. (FF, 
119). 
A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement by a party about a 
concrete fact within that party's knowledge. Estate ofRennick, 692 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 
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(111. 1998). "An admission of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission and is normally 
conclusive on the party making it. However, this rule is not absolute. The trial court may 
relieve a party from the consequences of a judicial admission." Baldwin v. Vantage 
Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984). Unsigned or unverified pleadings are, in some 
jurisdictions, inadmissible. See Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Redfield, 7 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 
1925); Estate of Nicholas, 111 Cal. App. 3d. 1071 (3rd Dist. 1986). Further, when a 
pleading signed by an attorney is not authorized by the client, it does not constitute a valid 
judicial admission. Malpica v. Sebastian, 425 N.E.2d 1029 (111. 1st Dist. 1981). The 
doctrine of judicial admission should be applied with caution. CJS Evidence § 397 
(1990). 
The evidence at trial was undisputed Ms. Lawrence had no knowledge of any 
participation in the payment of Mr. Wong. Because Ms. Lawrence had no actual 
knowledge of the filing of the Complaint in this matter, let alone the substance of the 
allegations found therein, the trial court should not have relied on those allegations as a 
judicial admission of fact. It is not in the interest of justice to ascribe liability to a person 
on the basis of statements made by someone she did not retain has her attorney, which 
statements she did not read, review or sign. Intermountain's counsel at trial even 
conceded the conspiracy allegation was brought more against Mr. Lawrence than Ms. 
Lawrence (Trans., Vol. II, p. 293, lines 12-14). The facts established at trial are: Ms. 
Lawrence went to Intermountain to help pick out a vehicle she understood was being paid 
for by cSave.net (Trans., Vol. I. p. 199, lines 10-12) and she drove it one time (Trans., 
Vol. I. p. 193 lines 11-15). For these actions, Ms. Lawrence now faces a judgment of 
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$238,267.24. Further, as noted above, she only ratified the "cause of action," not every 
factual allegation in the Complaint. 
POINT 3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPUTING ICNOWLEDGE OF 
AN ALLEGED CONSPIRACY TO MR LAWRENCE BASED UPON HIS 
MARRIAGE TO MS. LAWRENCE 
The trial court held: 
Because Mr. and Ms. Lawrence were married and cohabiting at the time Ms. 
Lawrence participated in the inducement to Mr. Wong, it is reasonable to infer that 
Mr. Lawrence was also aware of the inducement. The Court thus concludes that 
on the day Mr. Wong signed the leases at Intermountain, Mr. Lawrence was fully 
aware of, and intentionally participated in, the scheme to obtain and use vehicles 
without the intent to pay for their use. (FF, |^65). 
If the trial court's holding stands, all married persons must take note: if your spouse is 
participating in a conspiracy, you will automatically be liable as well. The trial court's 
holding amounts to "guilt by association." Surely such holding falls far short of 
determining by clear and convincing evidence that an individual participated in a 
conspiracy. Guilt by association, even the association of marital bonds, is contrary to 
standards our system of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Mellen, 393 F. 3d 175, 188 
(C.A.D.C. 2004) ("Such a finding threatens to turn all spouses into co-conspirators 
because of their agreement to marry-not because of their agreement to participate in a 
particular conspiracy. We require more specific evidence of guilt ....") (J. Henderson, 
dissenting in part). In other contexts, such as the filing of tax returns, an innocent spouse 
cannot be penalized for the acts of his/her spouse, of which the innocent spouse had no 
knowledge. See, e.g., May v. IRS, 168 F.Supp. 2d 781, 785-86 (S. D. Ohio 2001). 
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POINT 4. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE LAWRENCES 
LIABLE FOR CONVERSION BECAUSE INTERMOUNTAIN HAD NO RIGHTS 
TO THE BLACK RODEO BEFORE JANUARY 31, 2001, DID NOT OBTAIN A 
WRIT OF REPLEVIN UNTIL OCTOBER 5, 2001, AND BECAUSE THE 
LAWRENCES RELINQUISHED POSSESSION ON JANUARY 31,2001 
Conversion is an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession. 
Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 1991). See CL, f 47. The 
trial court's finding the Lawrences liable for conversion to Intermountain fails because 
Intermountain was not entitled to the Black Rodeo from April 1, 2000 until January 31, 
2001. During that time period, the vehicle was owned by Bank of America. (Ex. 61, 
attached hereto as Addendum "F"). Therafter, Intermountain could not repossess the 
vehicle if doing so caused a breach of the peace. It wasn't until October 5, 2001, that 
Intermountain obtained a writ of replevin. 
A conversion is an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession. 
Allred v. Hinckley, 328 P.2d 276 (Utah 1958). To prove conversion, Intermountain was 
required to establish that: (1) it had a right to the property; (2) it had an absolute and 
unconditional right to the immediate possession of the property; (3) it had made a demand 
for possession; and (4) the Lawrences wrongfully and without authorization assumed 
control, dominion, or ownership over the property. 
Moreover, essential to the doctrine of conversion is that the plaintiff have title or 
possession of the item allegedly converted. The general rule is that an action for 
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conversion is not maintainable unless the plaintiff, at the time of the alleged conversion, 
is entitled to immediate possession of the property. An interest in the property which 
does not carry with it a right to possession is no sufficient; the right to maintain the action 
may not be based upon a right to possession at a future time. Benton v. State Div. of State 
Lands and Forestry, 709 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1985). 
Intermountain was not entitled to absolute and unconditional right to the 
immediate possession of the Black Rodeo until January 31, 2001. Thereafter, its right 
was conditioned by self help without breach of the peace. A breach of the peace occurred 
and, thus, it was not even entitled to conditional possession on January 31, 2001. The 
courts are uniform a breach of the peace occurs when physical confrontation ensues. 
Thus, if there is threat of immediate physical confrontation or physical confrontation 
ensues, Intermountain was required to cease any further self-help procedure at that time. 
To proceed with self-help procedures when confronted with a breach of the peace is a 
violation of the self-help remedy under Utah Uniform Commercial Code, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 70A-9a-609(2)(b). By even orally protesting the repossession, many cases hold 
that a debtor prohibits the creditor's right to possess the collateral. White & R. Summers, 
Uniform Commercial Code § 26-6, p. 110-11 (2d ed. 1980). 
The facts establish the Lawrences had physical possession of the black Rodeo from 
March 31, 2000 until January 31, 2001, a period of 10 months. (FF, ffi[ 19, 28-19). On 
January 31, 2001, Intermountain attempted to repossess the Black Rodeo, but was 
unsuccessful. (FF, 1f28), Following Intermountain's attempted repossession, Mr. 
Lawrence returned the Black Rodeo to Mr. Schwenke, who was the owner of cSave.net, 
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which company Mr. Lawrence understood to be the lessee of the Black Rodeo. (FF, ^  29). 
The trial court, however, found the Lawrences liable for conversion for the time period of 
March 31, 2001 until January 31, 2001. CL, 1j 62 & 66. The trial court also found Mr. 
Lawrence liable for conversion for the time period from March 31, 2001 until July 10, 
2003, the point in time at which Intermountain was able to sell the vehicle, after it had 
been recovered. See CL, ^ f 66. 
Neither Lawrence was a signatory to the lease. Contractual terms are not binding 
upon non-parties to the contract. See, e.g., Metropolitan Alloys Corp. v. State Metals 
Indus., Inc., 416 F.Supp. 561 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Likewise, although the Lawrences 
generally knew of the monthly payment amount, there is no evidence in the record either 
Lawrence was aware of the any lease term prohibiting possession. 
The trial court's basis for finding Mr. Lawrence liable for a greater period of time 
was his entry of appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs and an attempted removal of the 
case to federal court. The trial court found by these actions, he "knowingly and 
intentionally acted to frustrate Intermountain's attempt to recover the vehicle, and that he 
deprived Intermountain of its ability to derive its expected financial benefit from the 
vehicle." Id. 
Mr. Lawrence entered his appearance on behalf of plaintiffs and began prosecuting 
their claims and defending against Intermountain's counterclaims in 2001. FF, ^[31. "A 
conversion is an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." 
Phillips, 811 P.2d at 179. Defense of a claim for conversion, during which time the 
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defendant maintains control or use of the property, cannot form the basis for conversion, 
or conspiracy to defraud, because a defense is not unlawful. Parties are allowed to 
prosecute claims and make defenses, even if the claims or defenses are ultimately denied. 
Even if the claims are frivolous, bringing such claims is not unlawful. Oxxford Clothes 
XX, 111 F.3d at 577. 
Following January 31, 2001, and at the time of his entry of appearance, Mr. 
Lawrence did not have physical control or custody of the Black Rodeo, nor did he ever 
have physical control or custody of the Green or Silver Rodeos. Rather, physical control 
and custody was had by Paul Schwenke and his family members. 
Further, on January 31, 2001 and at the later time Mr. Lawrence entered his 
appearance, rightful custody of the subject vehicles had not yet been established, but was 
in litigation. Mr. Lawrence did not have custody or control of the Black Rodeo after 
January 31, 2001 but, even if he did, it would not have been unlawful for him to keep 
possession of this vehicle until the court's order to remit it to Intermountain was entered 
in October 2001. Likewise, it was not unlawful for his clients to retain possession of the 
vehicles prior to October 2001 because Utah law requires Intermountain to cease self-help 
procedures when a breach of the peace occurred. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9a-
609(2)(b). 
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POINT 5. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
ARE EXCESSIVE 
A. Background of the Trial Court's Findings with respect to Damages 
The trial court calculated the total amount of monetary damages caused by the 
Lawrences to Intermountain to be $138,267.15. (SF, p. 36). The trial court reached this 
number by holding Mr. Wong, Mr. Lawrence and Ms. Lawrence jointly and severally 
liable for fraud or conspiracy to defraud in the amount of $80,412.87. (CL, Tf69). The 
trial court reached this latter number by calculating the amount Intermountain was forced 
to pay to repurchase the leases of three vehicles ($95,752.45), adding Intermountain's 
expenses in recovering the vehicles and selling them (approximately $8,000), and 
subtracting out the amount at which it was able to ultimately resell the three vehicles 
($23,408.98). (CL, f 35). The trial court then added pre-judgment interest ($57,854.38) 
to reach the total of $138, 267.15 as the base amount. (SF, p. 36). 
B, Because Utah precludes finding the Lawrences liable for conspiracy to defraud 
when they were found not liable for fraud, the punitive damages award cannot be 
based on any alleged conspiracy to commit fraud 
As argued above, the Lawrences cannot be found liable for conspiracy to defraud, 
when Intermountain failed to prove the Lawrences engaged in any direct fraud. The trial 
court expressly based its award against the Lawrences for $138,267.25 on the finding of 
liability for conspiracy to defraud. (FF, ^ |69). The trial court also concluded the monetary 
damage caused to Intermountain by the conversion of the Black Rodeo was $3,625.40. 
(FF, lj 69). If liable at all, the Lawrences should not be held liable to Intermountain for 
monetary damages greater than this amount. Although the Lawrences argue no punitive 
31 
damages should be awarded, if such damages are awarded, they should be based off the 
monetary damage amount of $3,625.40. 
G The court erred in basing its punitive damage award against the Lawrences on the 
loss of three vehicles, when they were found liable for conversion of only one 
vehicle 
A court may not base its award of punitive damages on acts of the tort-feasor 
outside the scope of those acts upon which liability is premised. See State Farm Ins Co, 
v. Campbell 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) ("A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from 
the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive 
damages."). Here, the finding of the Lawrences' liability for conversion was based upon 
conversion of a single black Rodeo, not three. (CL, *f 62). ("The Court concludes that 
Ms. Lawrence willfully interfered with Intermountain's possession of the Black Rodeo 
.... By her actions, she deprived Intermountain of its ability to derive financial benefit 
from the vehicle. Thus, she is liable for conversion of the Black Rodeo ....") (emphasis 
added). 
Even though the district court held the Lawrences liable for conversion to just one 
vehicle and not three, it nevertheless based its damages award against the Lawrences, 
both compensatory and punitive, on Intermountain's alleged deprivation of three vehicles, 
not one. The trial court thus punished the Lawrences for acts committed by third parties. 
Punitive damages may not be used to punish a party for the acts of another, or even for 
that party's dissimilar acts. State Farm Ins. Co. v. Campbell 538 U.S. 408 at 422, 423 
(2003). Even if the finding of conspiracy on the part of the Lawrences were allowed to 
stand, the Lawrences only had benefit of one vehicle, not three. 
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D. The court erred in basing its monetary and punitive damage award against Mr. 
Lawrence for the loss of the Black Rodeo from March 31, 2000 to July 10, 2003, 
when Mr. Lawrence only had possession of the Black Rodeo from March 31, 2000 
to January 31, 2001 
It was specifically found at trial that Mr. Lawrence, after learning of 
Intermountain's claimed ownership of the Black Rodeo, immediately returned it to Mr. 
Schwenke. (FF, %L9). The trial court found, "Mr. Lawrence turned the Black Rodeo 
over to Mr. Schwenke ...." (FF, Tf 29). Mr. Lawrence understood cSave.net to be the 
lessee. (Trans., Vol. II, p. 229, lines 1-20). Mr. Lawrence, on January 31, 2001, asked 
to see a court order during the repossession attempt. (FF, ^ 28). Such court order was 
not issued until October 5, 2001. Merely asserting rights, which rest upon a good faith 
belief, is no reason to ascribe punitive damages. There is nothing reprehensible in such 
conduct. See R&R Sails, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of State of Pa., 610 F. Supp. 2d 1222 
(S.D. Cal. 2009); Williams v. Younginer, 851 N.E. 2d 351 (Ind. App. 2006) ( proof that 
a tort was committed does not necessarily establish the right to punitive damages; 
punitive damages may be awarded only if there is clear and convincing evidence that 
defendant acted with malice, fraud, gross negligence, or oppressiveness which was not 
the result of a mistake of fact or law, honest error or judgment, overzealousness, mere 
negligence, or other human failing). By even orally protesting a repossession, many 
cases hold that a debtor prohibits the creditor's right to possess the collateral. White & 
R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 26-6, p. 110-11 (2d ed. 1980). 
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E. The trial court erred in including pre-judgment interest and attorney fees as a 
component of monetary damages to determine the ratio between actual and 
punitive damages 
The appropriate ratio of punitive damages should not be affected by the time 
elapsed between the filing of a complaint and the trial of the action, [n Campbell v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004), the Utah Supreme Court concluded that attorney 
fees and costs should not be included as part of the ratio to determine the appropriateness 
of the amount of punitive damage. Similarly, pre-judgment interest should not be a 
component used to determine the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages. "Under our 
general practice, the issues of whether attorney fees are available to a party and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees are reserved for determination by the judge after the 
conclusion of the trial or other proceedings." Id. Similarly, the issue of pre-judgment 
interest, under Utah trial practice, cannot be determined until liability and the basis 
therefore is found by the trier of fact. If this case were tried to a jury under our bifurcated 
system, prejudgment interest would not be part of the jury's deliberation because the issue 
of prejudgment interest calculation and its award may be contested issues and are ruled 
upon by the court long after a jury has determined punitive damages and the appropriate 
ratios. Why the ratio should be different in a case tried to the bench is difficult to justify.6 
6
 In candor to the Court, the Court in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 
(Utah 1991), appears to have included the pre-judgment interest amount in its analysis of 
the appropriate ratios of actual to punitive damages. However, the appropriateness of 
such inclusion was not contested or argued by the parties. 
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F. The punitive damage award violates the due process considerations set forth in 
State Farm v. Campbell 
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition 
of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor." State Farm Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). "The reason is that elementary notion so fairness 
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not 
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the 
penalty that a State may impose." Id. &\A\1 (internal citation omitted). To the extent an 
award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary 
deprivation of property." Id. "The most important indicium of the reasonableness of a 
punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." Id. 
at 419. The Supreme Court has instructed courts: 
to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether: the harm 
caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortuous conduct evinced 
indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of 
the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or 
was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, 
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Ms. Lawrence's "knowledge" of an alleged conspiracy was based entirely on a 
judicial admission that she ratified the "cause of action" alleged by an attorney she had 
not retained. Is this conduct reprehensible? Ms. Lawrence signed no agreement with 
Intermountain, did not know Mr. Wong at the time he signed the leases and was informed 
cSave.net was paying the lease amounts. Is this conduct reprehensible? Ms. Lawrence 
drove the Black Rodeo one time during a period of ten months when it was in her 
family's possession. Is this conduct reprehensible? Yet, the trial court imposed a liability 
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on Ms. Lawrence in an amount over $238,000. Surely the punitive damage awarded 
against Ms. Lawrence does not come close to satisfying the constitutional standards set 
forth in State Farm. 
Mr. Lawrence also had possession of the Black Rodeo for ten months. As soon as 
he learned Intermountain was attempting repossession, he returned it to cSave.net, who he 
thought was the rightful possessor. Is this conduct reprehensible? From that point 
forward, Mr. Lawrence did not have possession or control of the vehicle, Mr. Schwenke 
did. After Mr. Lawrence entered his appearance in the case, he defended the case on 
behalf of his clients, as he was entitled to do. Even though he was sanctioned $1,500 for 
his removal to federal court, is this conduct reprehensible? Mr. Lawrence was not in 
control of the vehicle when the writ of replevin was issued. He was not obligated to do 
more than advise his client of the writ and inform his client of the consequences of 
disobeying the court order. Would acting in such a way be considered reprehensible? As 
the attorney, he cannot be punished for his client's refusal to obey a court order. To do so 
would subject attorneys everywhere to punitive damages every time their clients refused 
to obey court orders. 
Neither Mr. Lawrence nor Ms. Lawrence's conduct constitutes a conspiracy to 
defraud. Indeed, neither of them can be found liable for conspiracy when Intermountain 
did not prove they participated in any direct fraud. The Lawrences can only be found 
liable, if at all, for conversion, and for a period of time when they actually had possession 
of one vehicle, the Black Rodeo. Any punitive damage award, to the extent one is called 
for, should be proportionate to the damages Intermountain suffered as a result of the 
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conversion of the Black Rodeo for a period of ten months. The Lawrences cannot be 
liable for damages incurred by Intermountain for loss of the Green and Silver Rodeos. 
The Lawrences never had possession of those vehicles and, as argued herein, did not 
conspire to defraud Intermountain of those vehicles. 
G. The Punitive Damages awarded are excessive pursuant to Crookston and BMW v. 
Gore 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) and BMW of 
North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (and their progeny) are controlling in this 
matter. The Court should consider the following Crookston factors in determining 
whether the punitive damage award against the Lawrences was excessive, if merited at 
all. 
1. The Nature of the Misconduct 
While punitive damages may be awarded for a finding and conclusion of 
conspiracy to defraud, the imposition of an award so disproportionate to the actual 
damages suffered must be justified by more than the mere fact of a finding of fraud. Both 
the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have recognized that, 
within the broader class of actions that merit not only actual, but exemplary damages, 
there is a subset of particularly egregious behaviors that will attract more severe 
sanctions. 
While the finding of conspiracy to defraud may support some award of punitive 
damages (if liability is presumed), the conduct found by the trial court lacks those 
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additional elements of blameworthiness that would sustain more substantial punitive 
damages. 
As stated in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996): 
infliction of economic injury, especially when done intentionally through 
affirmative acts of misconduct, or when the target is financially vulnerable, can 
warrant a substantial penalty. But this observation does not convert all acts that 
cause economic harm into torts that are sufficiently reprehensible to justify a 
significant sanction in addition to compensatory damages. Id. at 576 (citations 
omitted). 
Here, the trial court held "there is no evidence that this instance impaired 
Intermountain's ability to function or continue as a motor vehicle dealer." (SF, p. 33). In 
fact, Intermountain, on p. 17 of the Dealer Agreement with Isuzu (Ex. 37, relevant 
portions of which are attached as Addendum "G"), is responsible to provide "written 
evidence that the vehicle is covered by an acceptable existing policy and that IMAC 
[Isuzu] has been named as an additional insured and loss payee." If Intermountain had 
performed such a duty, the accident to the Black Rodeo would have been insured. Any 
conspiracy to defraud was not directed at vulnerable victims or otherwise in a manner 
sufficiently reprehensible to merit substantial punitive damages. See Diversified 
Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 63 P.3d 686 (Utah 2002). 
2. Facts and Circumstances Surrounding Defendants' Misconduct 
The next Crooks ton factor supplements the previous factor's objective 
assessment of the defendants' conduct with a more subjective inquiry into what the 
defendants knew and what was motivating their actions. The Lawrences obtained one 
vehicle for their use, which vehicle they thought was paid for by cSave.net. (Trans., 
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Vol. I, p. 193, lines 20-21; Trans., Vol. I, p. 194, line 20 through p., 195, line5; Trans., 
Vol. I, p. 199, lines 9 -17; & Trans., Vol. II, p. 220, lines 1-6). When Intermountain 
attempted repossession, Mr. Lawrence immediately returned the vehicle to cSave.net. 
Such conduct is not so profoundly reprehensible, if at all, to merit substantial punitive 
damages. And, as the trial court found, there was no misrepresentations on the part of 
the Lawrences of any particular fact to Intermountain. CL, fflf 60, 64. 
At SF, p. 29, the trial court relied on the complaint against West Valley Dodge to 
conclude this conspiracy to defraud is more pernicious and evil because it is an on-going 
pattern of a larger scheme. As argued above, the West Valley Dodge Complaint is not 
probative of anything. To bootstrap that complaint into both a liability conclusion of law 
as well as an aggravating factor for punitive damages is to place too much strain on the 
bootstrap. 
3. Effect of Defendants' Conduct on Plaintiffs and Others 
The Lawrence's conduct also did not have the widespread effect on groups of 
vulnerable victims or a devastating impact on Intermountain that would justify a large 
punitive damage award. "The larger number of people affected, the greater the 
justification for higher punitive damages." Campbell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 
1134 (Utah 2004). In this instance, only one entity was found to be injured by which an 
award of compensatory damages will make it whole. 
Again, Intermountain's ability to function was not impaired and there is no 
evidence the economic loss was a financial hardship, affected its business dealings or that 
it was faced with ruinous bankruptcy. The fact that compensatory damages awarded 
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makes Intermountain whole and has not affected their business mitigates against a 
significant punitive damage award in this case. 
4. Probability of Future Recurrence 
Ms. Lawrence is now divorced from Mr. Lawrence and has remarried. Any belief 
that she will be involved in a reoccurrence is misplaced. As to Mr. Lawrence, the 
possibility of his recidivism is also unlikely and remote and is another mitigating factor 
against any substantial punitive damage award. 
5. Relationship of the Parties 
As the Supreme Court has noted, the greater the trust reposed in a defendant, the 
greater will be the justification for a more significant award of punitive damages. 
Campbell, 65 P.3d 1134. A breach of a relationship of trust and confidence may auger in 
favor of a substantial punitive damage award. Here, the entity claimed to be injured was 
a corporation, intimately familiar with the potential risks of automobile retail financing 
and whose sole injury will be made whole by the compensatory damage award. 
Intermountain certainly is not an inexperienced and vulnerable individual. Intermountain 
can and does verify the credit worthiness of a potential customer. (See Trial Ex. 16). 
6. Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages 
The amount of punitive damages awarded against Mr. Lawrence is certainly above 
the guidelines announced in Crookston. In this case, the compensatory damage award 
was $80,412.87 (exclusive of pre-judgment interest). The punitive damages awarded 
were $484,000.00, a ratio of actual damages to punitive damages of almost 1 to 6. Where 
there are no significant aggravating factors, any award should be more closely aligned to 
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no more and probably less than a one-to-one ratio as referenced in State Farm Ins, Co v 
Campbell. Assuming liability for conversion, Mr. Lawrence should not have been found 
liable for damages above the fair rental rate of the Black Rodeo for approximately 10 
months and punitive damages should be awarded accordingly. The previous factors 
enunciated in Crookston are mitigating factors. 
CONCLUSION 
The Lawrences were presented use of a vehicle as compensation for Mr. 
Lawrence's work to Mr. Schwenke and cSave.net. The Lawrences had use of the vehicle 
only for a period of ten months, during which time they thought Mr. Schwenke's 
company was paying the lease. As soon as Mr. Lawrence learned of Intermountain's 
attempted repossession, he returned the vehicle to Mr. Schwenke. The Lawrences did not 
conspire to defraud. However, Ms. Lawrence now faces a judgment in excess of 
$238,000 and Mr. Lawrence faces a judgment in excess of $622,000. The trial court's 
finding should be reversed for the reasons set forth herein. 
Respectfully submitted this \\) day of October, 2009. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
DONALD J. WINDER 
LANCE F. SORENSON 
Attorneys for Appellants Victor and 
Cindy Lawrence 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILM BISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U' 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
WILMA L. SCHWENKE, TANIA P. 




INTERMOUNTAIN, INC., a Utah 
corporation doing business as Intermountain 
Isuzn, 1 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
JUDGMENT, and ORDER 
Civil No. 000904217 
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
Defendant, Counterclaimant 
and Third Party Plaintiff. 
vs. 
Wayne Wong, Wilma Schwenke, Tania 
Schwenke, Cindy Lawrence, Victor 
Lawrence, A. Paul Schwenke, and cSave.net. 
Counterclaim Defendants, 
Defendants, and/or Third 
Party Defendants. 
fll On June 4, 2007-June 6, 2007, the Court conducted a bench trial on 
Intermountain, Inc.'s ("Intermountain") 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(3)(B) claim against Wayne Wong, 
tod Intermountain5 s claims of fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and conversion against Victor and 
Cindy Lawrence.1 P. Bryan Fishburn represented Intermountain. Christian Burridge of Ford, 
Burridge & Higbee represented Victor and Cindy Lawrence. Knute A. Rife represented Wayne 
'The bench trial was limited to Defendant Intermountain's counterclaims and third party 
claims against Mr. Wong and Mr. and Ms. Lawrence. Plaintiffs' claims in the original complaint 
had been previously dismissed by the Court, and default judgments had also been entered against 
A. Paul Schwenke, Wilma and Tania Schwenke, and cSave.net for failure to respond to, and 
defend against, Intermountain's counterclaims and/or third-party claims. 
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Wong. The Court heard and considered the testimony presented at trial, the arguments of 
counsel, and the various documents admitted into evidence. The Court now enters the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
f2 Defendant and Counterclaimant Intermountain, Inc. is a licensed motor vehicle 
dealer and Isuzu franchisee with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
f3 Plaintiff Victor Lawrence ("Mr. Lawrence") is an attorney licensed to practice in 
the State of Utah. Mr. Lawrence and plaintiff Cindy Lawrence ("Ms. Lawrence") were married 
at the time the events giving rise to this litigation took place, and have since divorced. 
Tf4 A. Paul Schwenke ("Mr. Schwenke") was a business client of Mr. Lawrence who 
established a business entity named cSave.net, LLC ("cSave.net" or the "LLC") on November 4, 
1999. Mr. Lawrence prepared the Articles of Organization and Operating Agreement for 
cSave.net. According to the Articles of Organization, Wayne Wong ("Mr. Wong") was listed as 
a managing member of the LLC, although he testified that all he did for cSave.net was to "input 
information into the computer." 
f 5 cSave.nef s intended business objective was to operate an online grocery shopping 
business. According to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Wong's testimony, however, cSave.net never 
operated in that capacity. The evidence also shows that cSave.net never had significant assets 
nor good credit. 
f 6 On or about March 2000, Mr. Schwenke determined to lease certain vehicles for 
personal use by his wife Wilma and his daughter Tania. According to Mr. Lawrence, Mr. 
Schwenke also intended to lease a vehicle for Mr. and Ms. Lawrence's personal use as partial 
payment for legal services rendered by Mr. Lawrence. 
f7 Mr. Lawrence assisted Mr. Schwenke in his efforts by contacting Larry Miller 
Chrysler Jeep in Bountiful to explore leasing arrangements. Shortly after Mr. Lawrence's 
correspondence with the dealership in Bountiful, however, Mr. Schwenke contacted 
Intermountain to discuss leasing other vehicles. Ultimately, the vehicles were leased from 
Intermountain. Notably, however, Mr. Lawrence was present during some of Mr. Schwenke's 
negotiations with Intermountain, and at one point Mr. Lawrence advised Mr. Schwenke to return 
to the Bountiful dealership if Intermountain was not willing to meet the terms that the Bountiful 
dealership was offering. 
[^8 Mr. Schwenke's initial contact with Intermountain was ostensibly on behalf of 
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cSave.net,2 presumably as the prospective lessee. However, the negotiated leases were not 
signed on behalfofcSave.net. Rather, they were signed by Mr. Wong after Mr. Schwenke and 
the plaintiffs offered Mr. Wong $10,000.00 if he (Mr. Wong) would use his credit-worthiness 
and sign the leases for three vehicles. Mr. Wong agreed to go to Intermountain and sign the 
leases. 
*§9 At paragraph 41 of the complaint that initiated this case, Ms. Lawrence, as one of 
plaintiffs, stated: "[I]n order to induce plaintiff Wayne Wong to sign on the leases, plaintiffs 
agreed to pay him $10,000.00." See Plaintiffs Exhibit 31. Notwithstanding this judicial 
admission, at trial Ms. Lawrence denied any knowledge of, or participation in, the payment 
offered to Mr. Wong. Although there was disputed evidence concerning when Ms. Lawrence 
actually saw the complaint in which she participated as a plaintiff, it is clear that at her deposition 
in 2002 she ratified the claims of the original complaint without qualification. Throughout the 
trial, Ms. Lawrence's testimony was vague and inconsistent. As a result, the Court does not find 
Ms. Lawrence's testimony credible. 
TflO Neither Mr. Schwenke, nor any of the plaintiffs, including Mr. Wong, disclosed to 
Intermountain that plaintiffs were paying Mr. Wong $10,000.00 in exchange for his signature on 
the leases.3 George Thomas Watkins ("Mr. Watkins"), owner and general manager of 
Intermountain, testified that had Intermountain been aware of this fact, it would not have leased 
the vehicles to Mr. Wong. 
f 11 On or about March 31, 2000, Mr. Schwenke, Wilma, Tania, and Mr. and Ms. 
Lawrence each went to Intermountain's offices for the purpose of selecting the three vehicles. 
Mr. Wong also went to Intermountain that day, during his lunch break and in a hurry, in order to 
sign the leases. 
[^12 Although Mr. Schwenke appeared to have controlled most of the negotiations 
with Intermountain, the Court finds that Mr, and Ms, Lawrence also had some involvement in the 
lease negotiations—at least to the extent that both were aware that the monthly payments on each 
vehicle were supposed to be approximately $360. Mr. Lawrence also issued a personal check to 
Intermountain in the amount of $3000, which covered $1000 cash down for each of the three 
vehicles. Mr. Lawrence was subsequently reimbursed for that expenditure, although the source 
of the reimbursement was not made clear at trial. 
f 13 Mr. Wong, acting on the promise of receiving $10,000.00, but with no present 
intention of making any of the lease payments on the three vehicles, nevertheless personally 
2Mr. Schwenke's initial communication with Intermountain was a facsimile on cSave.net 
letterhead, dated March 29, 2000. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 10. However, there was no evidence 
presented at trial that would explain why cSave.net would be paying for vehicles to be used by 
individuals with no business relationship to the LLC. 
3Although promised a $10,000.00 payment, Mr. Wong actually received two payments 
totaling $7,500.00. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 32. 
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signed each of the three leases as the lessee. 
[^14 At trial Mr. Wong claimed that at the time he signed the leases, neither the 
monthly lease amount nor other terms had yet been filled in. According to Mr. Wong, he 
nevertheless went ahead and signed the leases in "blank," relying on Mr. Schwenke's 
representation that he (Mr. Schwenke) would make sure the lease forms were properly 
completed. Under questioning Mr. Wong admitted that Mr. Schwenke was not acting as his 
attorney in this transaction. 
If 15 Mr. Wong also alleged and attempted to show at trial that he was not the lessee on 
the leases, but that cSave.net was the intended lessee and he was simply signing as a guarantor on 
the leases. Mr. Wong's testimony throughout the trial was inconsistent and contradictory to his 
prior judicial admissions,4 and as a result the Court does not find Mr. Wong's testimony credible. 
In contrast, the Court credits Mr. Watkins' testimony that the documentation Intermountain 
received regarding cSave.net was not consistent with cSave.net being the intended lessee. 
Beyond the Articles of Organization and Operating Agreement that were provided to 
Intermountain, Mr. Watkins testified that Intermountain would also have required tax returns for 
the LLC dating back several years, credit information on all officers of the LLC, and notarized 
documents showing that the signer had authority.5 
If 16 The Court finds that cSave.net, as a start-up company with no significant assets or 
sufficient credit, could not have been the intended lessee. The Court finds it improbable that Mr. 
Schwenke and the plaintiffs would have offered Mr. Wong $10,000.00 to front his credit had 
cSave.net qualified as the lessee. The Court thus finds that Mr. Wong was, in fact, the intended 
lessee on each of the three vehicles. Even if Mr. Wong had intended to sign only as the 
guarantor, as he claimed, Mr. Wong would nevertheless have been responsible for payment on 
the leases when neither the LLC nor those in possession of the vehicles made payments. Under 
either scenario, Mr. Wong knowingly obligated himself to answer for payment on the leases, but 
his testimony was that at the time he signed the leases he had no present intent to make any 
payments on that obligation. 
f l7 In connection with the signing of the leases, Mr. Wong signed a credit application 
that misstated his gross annual income as $450,000, when in fact his gross annual income was 
4For example, in Mr. Wong's deposition dated September 1, 2000, Mr. Wong stated that 
he believed the drivers of the vehicles would be making the lease payments. In his testimony at 
trial, however, Mr. Wong insisted cSave.net would be making the payments. Additionally, Mr. 
Wong stated in his deposition that Mr. Lawrence was present at Intermountain the day he signed 
the leases. At trial, however, Mr. Wong insisted that his statements in the deposition were wrong 
and that Mr. Lawrence had not been present when he signed the leases, 
5Mr. Watkins' testimony suggested that the LLC related documents found in the "deal 
jacket" for the leases probably were provided because Mr. Wong was listed as a managing 
member ofcSave.net. 
4 
about $36,000.6 See Plaintiff s Exhibits HAand 18. 
If 18 Also in connection with the signing of the leases, Mr. Wong signed a commitment 
to maintain insurance on the leased vehicles, and provided Intermountain his automobile 
insurance information and policy number with Hartford Insurance Company.7 At some point in 
the next several months, however, Mr. Wong allowed his insurance coverage on each of the three 
leased vehicles to lapse. 
[^19 Following Mr. Wong's signing of the leases, each of the original plaintiffs except 
Mr. Wong took possession of the vehicles. Mr. Schwenke and Wilma took possession of a silver 
Isuzu Rodeo (the "Silver Rodeo"), Tania took possession of a green Isuzu Rodeo (the "Green 
Rodeo"), and Mr. and Ms. Lawrence took possession of a black Isuzu Rodeo (the "Black 
Rodeo"). 
f20 Sometime after the signing of the leases but before May 24, 2000, Intermountain 
sold the leases for the Silver and Green Rodeos to Isuzu Motors Acceptance Corporation and 
Isuzu LT. Intermountain sold the lease for the Black Rodeo to Bank of America, N.A. 
f21 None of the plaintiffs made any payments whatsoever on any of the three vehicles. 
Neither did Mr. Schwenke, cSave.net, nor Mr. Lawrence make any payments. 
f 22 On or about September 2000, after no payments on the Silver and Green Rodeos 
had been made, Isuzu Motors Acceptance Corporation/Isuzu LT demanded in writing that Mr. 
Wong present the vehicles for inspection in accordance with the terms of the lease agreements. 
Mr. Wong received the letters but ignored Isuzu's demand. Instead, Mr. Wong gave the demand 
letter to Mr. Schwenke. Mr. Wong testified that he made no inquiries at all as to who was in 
possession of those vehicles, nor their status. Mr. Wong also made no demand that Mr. 
Schwenke or others produce the vehicles. 
f 23 In October 2000, after Mr. Wong failed to present the Silver and Green Rodeos 
for inspection, and because payments had still not been made, Isuzu Motors Acceptance 
Corporation/Isuzu LT required Intermountain to repurchase the leases on the Silver and Green 
6The evidence regarding the credit application is unclear. Apparently, two separate credit 
applications were filled out, both purportedly signed by Mr. Wong but only one of which had Mr. 
Wong's genuine signature. Whether Mr. Wong actually filled out the terms of the credit 
application that contained his genuine signature was disputed. 
7Although Mr. Wong denied giving his policy number in connection with signing the 
leases, the Court finds that denial not credible. Mr. Wong admitted that Hartford was his 
insurance carrier. Mr. Watkins testified credibly that before any leased vehicle is allowed to 
leave the dealership, Intermountain confirms insurance coverage. The Court finds it improbable 
that Intermountain would have been able to confirm insurance coverage if Mr. Wong had not 
personally provided that information. 
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Rodeos.8 Intermountain paid $32,202.08 to repurchase the lease on the Silver Rodeo, and 
$28,272.13 to repurchase the lease on the Green Rodeo. See Plaintiffs Exhibits 43 and 57. 
T[24 Beginning in May 2000 and thereafter each month for several months, Mr. Wong 
also received multiple notices from Bank of America that lease payments on the Black Rodeo 
were due, and that late fees were accruing. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 20. As he did with the 
demand letters on the Silver and Green Rodeos, Mr. Wong ignored the Bank of America notices 
and turned them over to Mr. Schwenke. Mr. Wong did not inquire into who had possession of 
the Black Rodeo, nor did he make any of the payments as demanded. 
[^25 Because no payments had been made on the Black Rodeo by January 2001, 
Intermountain was required to repurchase the lease from Bank of America for $35,278.24. See 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 61 and 62. 
$26 After repurchasing the leases and regaining ownership of the three Rodeos, 
Intermountain sought to repossess each of the vehicles. 
^27 In November 2000, pursuant to a Writ of Replevin issued by the Court, a sheriff 
repossessed the Silver Rodeo from Wilma and Mr. Schwenke's residence in Kanosh, Utah. At 
that time, Intermountain learned that the Silver Rodeo had been in an accident and sustained 
substantial damage. Intermountain repaired the damages and later sold the Silver Rodeo to a 
retail customer for $13,898.00. 
f 28 On January 31, 2001, the same day Intermountam had regained ownership of the 
Black Rodeo, Intermountain unsuccessfully attempted to repossess the Black R.odeo while it was 
parked in a parking garage outside Mr. Lawrence's office in Salt Lake City. Mr. Watkins was 
present at the attempted repossession and showed Mr. Lawrence documentation evidencing 
Intermountain's reacquired rights over the Black Rodeo. Mr. Lawrence said he would not turn 
over the vehicle without a court order, A confrontation between Mr. Watkins and Mr. Lawrence 
ensued, and the police were called to the scene. The police allowed Mr. Lawrence to leave the 
scene with the Black Rodeo. 
[^29 Immediately after the attempted repossession, Mr. Lawrence turned the Black 
Rodeo over to Mr. Schwenke, notwithstanding Mr. Lawrence's knowledge that Intermountain 
was claiming ownership of the Black Rodeo. Upon receiving possession of the Black Rodeo, 
Mr. Schwenke gave permission to a family member to drive the Black Rodeo to California, 
where it was subsequently totaled in a single vehicle accident. 
Tf30 On May 23, 2001, because Intermountain did not know who had possession of the 
Green and Black Rodeos, Intermountain served Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents on the Schwenkes, Mr. and Ms. Lawrence, and Mr. Wong, to discover the location of 
those vehicles. 
8Mr. Watkins testified that under the terms of the dealership agreement with Isuzu, 
Intermountain was required to purchase back non-performing leases. 
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f31 Shortly after Intermountain served its Interrogatories, Mr. Lawrence entered an 
appearance as counsel on behalf of himself, Ms. Lawrence, the Schwenkes and Mr. Wong. 
Rather than answering Intermountain's Interrogatories, Mr. Lawrence delayed the proceedings by 
attempting to remove the case to federal court. The removal was denied and a $1500 judgment 
for attorneys fees was jointly and severally entered against each of the plaintiffs, Mr. Lawrence, 
and cSave.net. Mr. Wong learned of the $1500 judgment entered against him when he 
discovered that a lien had been recorded against his property. Mr. Wong subsequently paid the 
judgment in order to remove the lien. 
|32 The Court issued a Writ and Order of Replevin on the Black Rodeo on October 5, 
2001 and a Writ and Order of Replevin on the Green Rodeo on January 10, 2002. Neither Order 
of Replevin resulted in the immediate return of the Black and Green Rodeos, however. Only 
after the Court entered an Order on February 26,2006 finding the parties in contempt of court, 
did Mr. Lawrence finally answer the Interrogatories intended to ascertain the location of the 
Black and Green Rodeos. 
Tf33 On or about March 11, 2002, Mr. Schwenke finally returned the Green Rodeo to 
Intermountain, at which time Intermountain discovered that the Green Rodeo had also sustained 
substantial damage. Intermountain sold the Green Rodeo at auction a few months later for 
$8,310.98, after attempting but being unable to sell it on the retail market. 
f34 Mr. Schwenke also eventually returned the Black Rodeo to Intermountain in 2002. 
When Mr. Schwenke finally returned the Black Rodeo, it was delivered on a flatbed truck having 
been completely totaled in an accident in California. Intermountain unsuccessfully attempted to 
sell what was left of the Black Rodeo to a wholesaler, but ended up selling the vehicle to one of 
its employees for $1,200.00. 
f35 After repurchasing the leases from Bank of America and Isuzu Motors 
Acceptance Corporation/Isuzu LT for $95,752.45, incurring approximately $8,000.00 in 
expenses (not including attorneys fees) in recovering and preparing the vehicles for sale, and 
reselling the three vehicles for $23,408.98, Intermountain was left with a net loss of $80,412.87. 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 66. 
*|36 In September 2003, Mr. Wong filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code. Instead of listing Intermountain as a creditor on his bankruptcy filing, 
as was his obligation under 11 U.S.C. §521(1), Mr. Wong listed Isuzu Motors Acceptance 
Corporation, Isuzu LT, and Bank of America as creditors. 
f37 Mr. Wong claimed at trial that he was unaware Intermountain had repurchased the 
leases and thus did not deliberately leave Intermountain off his list of creditors. However, Mr. 
Wong received actual notice of Intermountain's repurchase of the three vehicle leases at least two 
years before he filed for bankruptcy. First, Intermountain notified Mr. Wong's counsel 
immediately after repurchasing the leases that it was again the owner of the leases. See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 67 and 68. Second, Mr. Wong received actual and personal notice in May 
2001 when Intermountain filed its First Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint, which explicitly stated that it had repurchased the leases on each of the vehicles. See 
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Plaintiffs Exhibit 88. This First Amended Answer was served upon Mr. Wong at his home 
address. 
f38 Because Mr. Wong failed to list Intermountain on his list of creditors, 
Intermountain never received formal notice of Mr. Wong's bankruptcy. Intermountain did not 
become aware of Mr. Wong's bankruptcy until January 2005, when an Intermountain employee 
inadvertently opened a bankruptcy notice addressed to Isuzu Motors Acceptance Corporation but 
mailed to Intermountain's offices. 
f39 Because Mr. Wong failed to list Intermountain as a creditor, and the amount of 
time that had lapsed before Intermountain learned of the bankruptcy, Intermountain was time-
barred under the bankruptcy Code from filing a non-dischargeability action against Mr. Wong. 
TJ40 Of significance, on March 30, 2000 (one day before Mr. Wong, Mr. and Ms. 
Lawrence and the other plaintiffs went to Intermountain to select, negotiate and sign the leases 
for the three Rodeos), Mr. Lawrence filed a lawsuit on behalf of Mr. Schwenke, Wilma 
Schwenke, Ms. Lawrence and others (but not Mr. Wong), regarding a similar although not 
identical deal with West Valley Dodge.9 
TJ41 In the case against West Valley Dodge, another Schwenke-controlled business 
entity, Bonneville Investment Group, arranged the leasing of two Dodge Durangos and one 
Dodge Ram. One of the vehicles, a green Durango, was given to Mr. and Ms. Lawrence for their 
personal use. The Lawrences never made payments on that leased vehicle, resulting in the 
vehicle being repossessed from their residence in Bountiful, Utah. The other Durango and 
Dodge Ram were likewise repossessed from the Schwenkes because of lack of payment. 
*|42 In each case, shortly after receiving possession of the vehicles, Mr. Lawrence was 
involved in filing and/or prosecuting lawsuits against the dealerships on behalf of many of the 
same individuals who became plaintiffs in this case. In each case, the plaintiffs alleged breach of 
contract and other claims. Then, having filed suit against each dealership, the plaintiffs used the 
lawsuits as a basis for asserting a right to continue possessing and using vehicles for which they 
were making no payments. In each case, the dealerships were forced to take action to repossess 
the vehicles. 
f43 Less than one month after vehicles leased from West Valley Dodge were 
repossessed, Mr. .and Ms. Lawrence, Mr. Schwenke, and the other plaintiffs in the present action 
went to Intermountain and in large measure attempted to replicate their transaction with West 
Valley Dodge. The Court finds that the two cases, involving many of the same parties and 
9The Court has no knowledge concerning the outcome of the case against West Valley 
Dodge, and makes no findings regarding that case. Rather, the Court is relying on allegations 
which Mr. Lawrence made on behalf of the plaintiffs (including Ms. Lawrence) in the complaint 
against West Valley Dodge. As judicial admissions by those plaintiffs, the statements in that 
complaint can be properly considered against those same individuals in this case as probative of a 
pattern of conduct. 
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occurring within weeks of each other, strongly suggest a pattern of knowing and intentional 
conduct on the part of several plaintiffs in this case, including Mr. and Ms. Lawrence. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
f 44 Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court because the transaction at issue in 
this case, including the negotiating and signing of the leases, took place at Intermountain's 
offices in Salt Lake County. 
A. Applicable Legal Standards 
Tf45 Fraud. Under Utah law, fraud is established when a party proves by clear and 
convincing evidence: "(1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representer either (a) knew to be false, or (b) 
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was 
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage." Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198,207-208 (Utah 2001). 
Tf46 Conspiracy to Defraud. "A conspiracy to defraud is fraud committed by two or 
more persons who share an intent to defraud another." Debry v. Cascade Construction Co., 879 
P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994). Conspiracy to defraud must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978), 
Tf47 Conversion. "A conversion is an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done 
without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and 
possession. The full measure of damages of conversion is the full value of the property." 
Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 1991). "Although conversion 
results only from intentional conduct it does not however require a conscious wrongdoing, but 
only an intent to exercise dominion or control over the goods inconsistent with the owner's 
right." Id. Conversion need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
f48 Motion to Amend Pleadings. Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states, in pertinent part, that "[sjuch amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause 
them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment." 
1f49 Judicial Admissions. Though the rule is not absolute, generally "an admission of 
fact in a pleading is a judicial admission and is normally conclusive on the party making it." 
Baldwin v. Vantage Corp , 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984) (citing Yates v Large, 284 Or. 217, 
585 P.2d 697 (1978). 
150 Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C $521(a)(iyAV Section 521(a)(1)(A) of the 
Bankruptcy Code imposes an affirmative duty on a debtor who has filed bankruptcy to file and 
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provide a list of creditors. 
Tf51 Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. g523(a)(2¥A>). Section 523(a)(2)(A) makes 
nondischargeable a debt obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.11 
%52 Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. §523fa¥3YB>). A creditor may bring a Section 
523(a)(3)(B) claim to declare a debt nondischargeable in cases where the debtor obtained a debt 
by fraud, and failed to give the creditor notice of the debtor's bankruptcy filing in time for the 
creditor to file a nondischargeability claim against the debtor under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), A 
section 523(a)(3)(B) claim requires: (1) proof of fraud; (2) proof that the debtor did not identify 
the creditor in his or her bankruptcy filing; and (3) proof that the creditor did not learn by other 
means of the debtor's bankruptcy in time to file a nondischargeability complaint for fraud.12 
f53 Punitive Damages. Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1 (l)(a) states: "Except as otherwise 
provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded only if compensalory or general damages 
are awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or 
1011 U.S.C. §521(a)(l)(A), "Debtors duties", states: 
(a) The debtor shall-
(1) file 
(A) a list of creditors ... 
l l l l U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A) states: 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141,1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title 
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
a)... 
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing 
of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud... 
1211 U.S.C. §523(a)(3)(B) states: 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141,1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title 
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
a)... 
(2) [see above] ... 
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with the 
name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time 
to permit-
(A)... 
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of 
this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a 
determination of dischargeability of such debt under one of such 
paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the 
case in time for such timely filing and request. 
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conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights 
of others." In addition, §78-18-1(2) states: "Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition 
shall be admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made." 
B. Wayne Wong 
<J54 The Court concludes that Mr. Wong committed fraud against Intermountain. Mr. 
Wong's conduct satisfies the elements of fraud in that he knowingly made several material 
misrepresentations to Intermountain, intending that Intermountain rely upon those 
misrepresentations. Intermountain did, in fact, reasonably rely upon Mr. Wong's 
misrepresentations to its detriment. Mr. Wong's affirmative misrepresentations included: (a) 
signing the leases for the three Rodeos as the lessee with no intention of making any payments on 
the vehicles; (b) signing documents that committed him to maintain insurance on the leased 
vehicles when he had no intention of doing so; and (c) agreeing to lease terms that obligated him 
to maintain control of the leased vehicles (including restricting others from more than temporary 
possession) when he had no intention to use or possess the vehicles.13 In addition, Mr. Wong 
also misrepresented his intentions to Intermountain through a material omission, that is, his 
failure to disclose to Intermountain that he was promised $10,000.00 in exchange for his 
signature on the leases. 
f 55 The Court concludes that these material misrepresentations and omissions by Mr. 
Wong were made knowingly and for the purpose of inducing Intermountain to act upon them and 
lease the three vehicles to him. As a result of Intermountain's reasonable reliance upon Mr. 
Wong's misrepresentations, Intermountain suffered substantial damages by later having to 
repurchase the leases and repossess the vehicles after they had been severely damaged. As Mr. 
Watkins testified, Intermountain would never have leased the vehicles to Mr. Wong if it had 
known the falsity of Mr. Wong's representations. 
Tf56 Having satisfied the elements of fraud, the Court next concludes that Mr. Wong 
knowingly failed to identify Intermountain as a creditor when he filed for bankruptcy. Mr. Wong 
claimed that he did not list Intermountain as a creditor because he was not aware Intermountain 
was the owner of the leases. The Court concludes that this argument is without merit. As 
discussed at <J37 above, both Mr. Wong and Mr. Wong's attorney received notice that 
Intermountain had repurchased the leases on all three Rodeos. Mr. Wong had actual knowledge 
that Intermountain owned the leases on each of the three vehicles at least two years before he 
filed for bankruptcy. 
Tf57 Finally, the Court concludes that Intermountain did not learn of Mr. Wong's 
l3The Court has noted a discrepancy between the income amounts attributed to Mr. Wong 
as reflected in the credit application to Intermountain. See ^17 and note 6, supra. Although that 
discrepancy could also be considered a material misrepresentation, there was no clear evidence of 
who provided the $450,000 income figure. Because of unanswered questions surrounding the 
credit applications, the Court has not included that misrepresentation as a basis for its present 
conclusion. 
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bankruptcy in time to file a non-dischargeability action. Intermountain never received formal 
notice of Mr. Wong's bankruptcy. Rather, as discussed at [^38 above, Intermountain happened 
upon the information by accident in January 2005, some sixteen months after Mr. Wong filed for 
bankruptcy. At that point, it was too late for Intermountain to protect its interests during the 
bankruptcy proceeding. 
Tf58 Based on the preceding analysis, the Court concludes that Mr. Wong is liable to 
Intermountain under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(3)(B) and that the debt is non-dischargeable.14 
C Cindy Lawrence 
f 59 Cindy Lawrence's Motion to Amend Pleadings per Rule 15fh), At closing 
argument, Ms. Lawrence's counsel moved to amend the pleadings so as to alter the effect of her 
prior judicial admissions. Specifically, Ms. Lawrence sought to amend paragraph 41 of the 
original complaint that stated "[I]n order to induce plaintiff Wayne Wong to sign on the leases, 
plaintiffs agreed to pay him $10,000.00." Under Rule 15(b), when issues not addressed in the 
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent, amendment may be made to conform to the 
evidence. Those circumstances are not applicable here. In this case, the pleadings expressly 
addressed the actions which plaintiffs, including Ms. Lawrence, had taken to induce Mr. Wong to 
sign the leases on their behalf The Court rejects Ms. Lawrence's argument that all of the 
evidence presented at trial showed that she knew nothing of the $10,000.00 promised to Mr. 
Wong. On the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that Ms. Lawrence ratified the original 
complaint without qualification when she was questioned during her deposition in 2002. 
Although she claimed not to have seen the complaint until after it was filed, Ms. Lawrence 
testified that she would have authorized her agent to file the complaint on her behalf. 
I4On three separate occasions Mr. Wong challenged the ability of this Court to entertain a 
cause of action under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(3)(B). Three separate judges ruled against Mr. Wong's 
argument that federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction. Most recently, this matter was heard on 
March 21, 2007. At that hearing the Court held that the state courts share concurrent jurisdiction 
with the federal district courts in determining whether a debt is excepted from discharge because 
the debt was obtained through fraud or false pretenses, and the creditor learns of the filing too 
late to challenge the discharge. The Court's decision was based on the reasoning in In re 
Franklin, 179 B.R. 913, 919-920 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that causes of action that 
exist solely because of federal law, such as §532(a)(3)(b), "arise under" Title 11 and both state 
and federal courts have jurisdiction to decide the issue. See also 28 U.S.C. §1334(b) (".. .the 
[U.S.] district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings 
arising under Title 11 [the bankruptcy code], or arising in or related to cases under Title 
1 l")(emphasis added). The Franklin court also held that because the creditor in that case did not 
have notice of the bankruptcy he was unable to comply with the sixty-day deadline and was 
therefore permitted to litigate the dischargeability of the fraud claim in state court "at any time." 
In re Franklin, 179 B.R. at 923-24. Based on this reasoning Intermountain's claim under 11 
U.S.C. 523(a)(3)(B) was allowed to proceed to trial. The holding herein is based on the Court's 
prior determination and the facts adduced at trial. 
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Additionally, this case has been pending since 2000, yet it was not until the Court noted that the 
allegations in the complaint were judicial admissions admissible against Ms. Lawrence, that she 
sought to amend the complaint to eliminate the effect of that admission. Ms. Lawrence has been 
represented by counsel at every stage of these proceedings, and either she or her counsel knew, or 
should have known, that Intermountain was relying on that statement in the complaint as support 
for its claims against her. Notwithstanding that knowledge, Ms. Lawrence waited until the last 
possible minute to challenge this particular admission. For all these reasons, the Court denies 
Ms. Lawrence's motion to amend the pleadings. 
TJ60 Fraud. While there is substantial probative evidence supporting Ms. Lawrence's 
participation in the fraudulent scheme against Intermountain, the Court cannot identify any 
affirmative misrepresentations made directly by Ms. Lawrence to Intermountain.15 As a result, 
the Court cannot conclude that Intermountain established by clear and convincing evidence that 
Ms. Lawrence's actions satisfy the elements of fraud. 
f61 Conspiracy to Defraud. Although the Court does not hold that Ms. Lawrence 
directly committed fraud, the Court concludes that Ms. Lawrence conspired to defraud 
Intermountain. The following facts point to Ms. Lawrence's knowing and intentional 
participation in the fraud: (a) Approximately one month before Ms. Lawrence obtained 
possession of the Black Rodeo, West Valley Dodge repossessed a Durango from the Lawrences 
that had been leased by Mr. Schwenke under a similar arrangement.16 (b) Ms. Lawrence 
participated in the $10,000.00 offered to Mr. Wong to induce him to sign the leases from which 
she would benefit by receiving and using one of the vehicles, (c) Ms. Lawrence was present at 
the time the leases were negotiated and signed, and she was generally aware of the anticipated 
financial terms, (d) Ms. Lawrence took possession of the Black Rodeo with no intention or 
expectation of making any payments on the vehicle, nor did she make any effort to ensure that 
payments would be made, (e) Ms. Lawrence lent her name to a lawsuit designed to impede 
Intermountain's efforts to recover the vehicle she was using without lawful claim. As a result of 
Ms. Lawrence's participation in this scheme, she benefitted personally to the detriment of 
Intermountain. Intermountain suffered actual and substantial financial damage from the 
fraudulent scheme. The Court believes and holds that the totality of the evidence establishes Ms. 
Lawrence's knowing and intentional participation as a conspirator to the fraud perpetrated by Mr. 
Schwenke and Mr. Wong. 
15Although Ms. Lawrence was present on the day of the signing and a participant in the 
inducement that had been offered to Mr. Wong, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. Lawrence 
had an affirmative duty to disclose that inducement to Intermountain, or that her failure to 
disclose the inducement constituted a misrepresentation by material omission. 
16The close parallels between this case and the facts alleged in the case against West 
Valley Dodge (in which Ms. Lawrence is also a plaintiff), see ^[40-43 supra, strongly suggest that 
at the time plaintiffs recruited Mr. Wong to participate in the scheme to lease vehicles, and 
certainly by the time Mr. Wong signed those leases, Ms. Lawrence was fully aware of and 
consented to benefit from the use of those vehicles under terms that she had no intention of 
honoring. 
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[^62 Conversion. The Court holds that Ms. Lawrence is liable to Intermountain for 
conversion of the Black Rodeo from March 31, 2000 through January 31, 2001. Ms. Lawrence's 
possession of the Black Rodeo was never lawful under the terms of the lease. She was not the 
lessee on the vehicle, and the terms of the lease prohibited anyone other than the lessee to have 
extended possession of the vehicle. Although the trial testimony was that the plaintiffs always 
intended that the Black Rodeo be used primarily by Ms. Lawrence, she allowed Mr. Lawrence to 
turn over the vehicle to Mr. Schwenke after Intermountain attempted to repossess it on January 
31, 2001. The Court concludes that Ms. Lawrence wilfully interfered with Intermountain's 
possession of the Black Rodeo, and that she did so without lawful justification. By her actions, 
she deprived Intermountain of its ability to derive its expected financial benefit from the vehicle. 
Thus, she is liable for conversion of the Black Rodeo for the period of M,arch 31, 2000 through 
January 31, 2001, which represents the time that the vehicle was in possession of the Lawrences. 
D. Victor Lawrence 
f63 Intermountain's Motion to Amend Pleadings per Rule 15ffr). At closing 
argument, Intermountain moved to amend its pleadings to add the claim of aiding and abetting 
against Mr. Lawrence. Although Intermountain had ample opportunity to amend its complaint 
prior to trial, it, too, waited until the last possible moment to raise a new basis for asserting 
liability against Mr. Lawrence, informing the Court of its new theory at closing argument. The 
Court finds that such late amendment would unduly prejudice Mr. Lawrence and therefore denies 
the motion. 
%64 Fraud. As was the case with Ms. Lawrence, the Court cannot identify any 
affirmative misrepresentations made directly by Mr. Lawrence to Intermountain. As a result, the 
Court cannot conclude that Intermountain established by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. 
Lawrence's actions satisfy the elements of fraud. 
Tf65 Conspiracy to Defraud. Although the Court does not hold that Mr. Lawrence 
directly committed fraud, the Court concludes that Mr. Lawrence conspired to defraud 
Intermountain. The following facts point to Mr. Lawrence's knowing and intentional 
participation in the fraud: (a) Approximately one month before Mr. Lawrence obtained 
possession of the Black Rodeo, West Valley Dodge repossessed a Durango from the Lawrences 
that had been leased by Mr. Schwenke under a similar arrangement, (b) Shortly thereafter, Mr. 
Lawrence assisted Mr. Schwenke in his efforts to secure a new vehicle by contacting a Bountiful 
dealership, and attempting to negotiate a new set of leases, (c) Mr. Lawrence was present at the 
negotiations the day Mr. Wong signed the leases and knew the general financial terms of the 
leases. Mr. Lawrence even testified that at one point he told Mr. Schwenke to go back to the 
Bountiful dealership if Intermountain could not meet the terms offered by that dealership, (d) 
Mr. Lawrence provided the down payment for each of the three Rodeos, (e) Mr. Lawrence took 
possession of the Black Rodeo with no intent or expectation to pay for the vehicle, and without 
ensuring that payment would be made, (f) Because Mr. and Ms. Lawrence were married and 
cohabiting at the time Ms. Lawrence participated in the inducement to Mr. Wong, it is reasonable 
to infer that Mr. Lawrence was also aware of that inducement. The Court thus concludes that on 
the day Mr. Wong signed the leases at Intermountain, Mr. Lawrence was fully aware of, and 
14 
intentionally participated in, the scheme to obtain atid use vehicles without the intent to pay for 
their use. As a result of Mr. Lawrence's participation in the scheme, he benefitted personally to 
the detriment of Intermountain. Intermountain suffered actual and substantial financial damage 
from this fraudulent scheme. The Court holds that Mr. Lawrence was also a knowing and 
intentional participant in the fraud perpetrated by Mr. Schwenke and Mr. Wong. 
%66 Conversion. The Court holds that Mr. Lawrence is jointly liable with Ms. 
Lawrence for conversion of the Black Rodeo from March 31, 2000 through January 31, 2001. 
The Court further holds that Mr. Lawrence is separately liable for conversion of the Black Rodeo 
from March 31, 2000 through the date the Black Rodeo was sold to an Intermountain employee 
for $1,200.00. Mr. Lawrence's possession of the Black Rodeo was never lawful under the terms 
of the lease. He was not the lessee, and the terms of the lease prohibited anyone other than the 
lessee from having extended possession of the vehicle. Moreover, after Intermountain's attempt 
to repossess the Black Rodeo on January 31,2001, Mr. Lawrence turned the vehicle over to Mr. 
Schwenke, thereby thwarting Intermountain's ability to recover the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, 
Mr. Lawrence entered his appearance as counsel'on behalf of the plaintiffs and improperly 
attempted to remove the case to federal court, for wfu'ch he was sanctioned. The Court conc/udes 
that Mr. Lawrence wilfully interfered with Intermountain's possession of the Black Rodeo, and 
that he did so without lawful justification. By his actions, the Court concludes that Mr. Lawrence 
knowingly and intentionally acted to frustrate Intermountain's attempt to recover the vehicle, and 
that he deprived Intermountain of its ability to derive its expected financial benefit from the 
vehicle. As a result, the Court holds Mr. Lawrence separately liable for conversion of the Black 
Rodeo from the time he turned over the vehicle to Mr. Schwenke on January 31,2001, until the 
time the vehicle was recovered by Intermountain and sold to an employee on July 10, 2003. 
E. Punitive Damages 
\61 In addition to compensatory damages, Intermountain has requested punitive 
damages from Mr. Wong and the Lawrences. The Court has already held that Mr. Wong and the 
Lawrences acted fraudulently or conspired to defraud Intermountain. At a minimum, the conduct 
of Mr. Wong and the Lawrences constitutes knowing and reckless indifference toward 
Intermountain. As a result, the Court concludes that punitive damages are appropriate in this 
case. Since no evidence regarding the wealth or financial condition of the parties was presented 
at trial, a Court hearing will be scheduled for that purpose. 
JUDGMENT ANIlOjjDEE 
TJ68 The Court holds that Wayne Wong fraudulently attempted to discharge his debt 
and knowingly failed to give timely notice of his bankruptcy filing to Intermountain. As a result, 
Intermountain was unable to protect its interest in a timely way before the bankruptcy court. 
Because of Mr. Wong's wrongful conduct, and pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(3)(B), the Court 
holds that Mr. Wong's bankruptcy did not effect a discharge of the debt secured through fraud 
upon Intermountain. The Court further holds that Victor and Cindy Lawrence each committed 
conspiracy to defraud and conversion against Intermountain, for which Intermountain is entitled 
to recover. 
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Tf69 The Court holds that Wayne Wong, Victor Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence are 
jointly and severally liable to Intermountain for fraud or conspiracy to defraud in the amount of 
$80,412.87. Victor and Cindy Lawrence are jointly and severally liable to Intermountain for their 
conversion of the Black Rodeo in the amount of $3,625.40 (representing fair rental value of the 
Black Rodeo from April 1, 2000 to January 31, 2001 at $362.54 per month), plus prejudgment 
interest. Victor Lawrence is separately liable to Intermountain for his conversion of the Black 
Rodeo in the amount of $34,284.20 (representing Intermountain's cost to recover and repurchase 
the Black Rodeo less the $1,200.00 it recovered by selling it), plus prejudgement interest. 
f70 The Court will consider Intermountain5 s punitive damages claim after a Court 
hearing is held to determine the wealth and financial condition of Mr. Wong and Mr. and Ms. 
Lawrence. Counsel for Intermountain is directed to contact the Court's clerk to schedule the 
hearing. So Ordered. 
Dated this }(?- day of August, 2007. By the Court: 
'^^wistrict Court Judge 
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This case was initially tried to the bench June 4 - June 6, 2007. The Court, on August 13, 
2007, entered detailed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment in favor of 
Intermountain, Inc., against Wayne Wong, Victor Lawrence, and Cindy Lawrence. The court 
found that Mr. Wong engaged in fraud, and that Cindy Lawrence and Victor Lawrence 
participated in a conspiracy to defraud Intermountain. The Court additionally found that Victor 
and Cindy Lawrence were liable to Intermountain for a conversion of the black Rodeo. In the 
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process, the court ruled that Intermountain, Inc. established that the defendants' conduct was 
such that it warranted an award of punitive damages. The court previously held: 
E. Punitive Damages. 
Tf67 In addition to compensatory damages, Intermountain has 
requested punitive damages from Mr. Wong and the Lawrences. 
The Court has already held that Mr. Wong and the Lawrences 
acted fraudulently or conspired to defraud Intermountain. At a 
minimum, the conduct of Mr. Wong and the Lawrences 
constitutes knowing and reckless indifference toward 
Intermountain. As a result, the Court concludes that punitive 
damages are appropriate in this case. Since no evidence regarding 
the wealth or financial condition of the parties was presented at 
trial, a Court hearing will be scheduled for that purpose. 
A second stage of trial was therefore scheduled for the purpose of receiving evidence 
concerning defendants' wealth and financial condition, and additional evidence relevant to the 
issue of punitive damages. This second phase of trial was held March 10-11, 2008. P. Bryan 
Fishburn, Esq. represented Intermountain, Inc. Knute Rife, Esq. represented Wayne Wong. Brent 
Stephens, Esq. represented Victor Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court reiterates its earlier Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based on 
evidence received at the second phase of trial, the Court finds the following additional facts: 
1. The Court previously found that a confrontation ensued between Mr. Lawrence and 
Mr. Watkms, Mermountain's owner, when Intermountain on January 31, 2001 unsuccessfully 
attempted to repossess the black Rodeo, which was in Mr. Lawrence's possession. Prior Findings 
of Fact, f 28. In between the first and second stage of trial in this case, Victor Lawrence's claims 
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for assault and battery and other claims against Mr. Watkins were heard and decided in another 
proceeding, Lawrence v. Intermountain, Inc., Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
case no. 020906142 (Iwasaki, J.). Following a bench trial on January 16,2008, the court 
dismissed Lawrence's claim and made findings of fact, including that in the course of the 
attempted repossession on January 31,2001, Mr. Lawrence, without cause or justification, 
attacked Mr. Watkins, seizing him and grabbing his head in a headlock, and that during this 
altercation, Watkins sustained a cut to his forehead and a bruise on his neck. See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 106, setting forth Findings of Fact by Judge Iwasaki in case no. 070906142. This Court, 
in reliance on the doctrine of issue preclusion, see Brigham Young v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 
2005 UT 19127, adopts this finding and holds it applicable to this case. 
2. As concerns the issue of financial wealth, Mr. Lawrence represented to the Court in his 
Trial Brief and in the course of the trial that he was financially destitute, or nearly so. Mr. 
Lawrence's Trial Brief stated: 
As to Victor Lawrence, the anticipated testimony is expected to 
show that he also has no assets, has a negative net worth in excess 
of $700,000 based on an IRS tax lien and notice of levy and 
currently has no income stream. While he may have had sustained 
earnings in previous years, he has none presently. 
To the contrary, the court finds that Mr. Lawrence, at least from the early 2000's forward 
up to and including February, 2008, has been the recipient of considerable, regular income and 
owns at least one asset, in the form of intellectual property, that has extraordinary value. 
3. In August 2000, Mr. Lawrence formed two limited liability companies, Lupus Lost, LC 
and Hawaiian Investments, LC. See Plaintiffs Exhibits 103 and 115. 
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4. Articles of Organization were filed with the state of Utah for Lupus Lost, LC on 
August 30,2000. The Articles named three members: Victor Lawrence (managing member); 
Hawaiian Investments, LC (designating Cindy Lawrence as its manager); and PCP, LC (also with 
Cindy Lawrence as its manager). See Plaintiffs Exhibit 103. 
5. Mr. Lawrence, when asked during the trial about Lupus Lost, testified that it never 
owned any assets. The court takes judicial notice that Lupus Lost is no longer in good standing 
with the State of Utah, its registration with the State of Utah having expired August 30, 2006. 
6. Articles of Organization were filed with the state of Utah for Hawaiian Investments, 
LC on August 31,2000, the day after Articles were filed for Lupus Lost, LC. The Articles named 
two members: Cindy Lawrence (who was again identified as the company's manager) and PCP, 
LC (with Cindy Lawrence again identified as its manager). The Articles designated Victor 
Lawrence as registered agent for the company. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 115. 
7. Mr. Lawrence, from sometime in the late 1990s to at least June 23, 2004 was also the 
sole owner of a law practice that operated under the name of the Lexington Law Firm. See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 100 (Petition filed by Victor Lawrence with the United States District Court, 
D. Utah at f2). 
8. Mr. Lawrence during this period of time operated the Lexington Law Firm as a sole 
proprietorship. As the sole owner, Mr. Lawrence was entitled to all the net profits generated by 
the Lexington Law Firm. 
9. Mr. Lawrence managed the Lexington Law Firm, which employed several attorneys 
including an attorney named John Heath, and a staff of other employees, 
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10. The focus of the Lexington Law Firm's practice was credit repair, i.e., assisting 
clients in repairing their credit. See Plaintiffs Exhibits 94, 95. 
11. As much as 90% of Lexington's credit repair clients were drawn to Lexington by 
advertising on the internet. Lexington's advertising appears to have been extensive in its scope 
and nature. 
12. Lexington drew its credit repair clients from across the United States. By mid-2004 
when Mr. Lawrence, during the pendency of this case, purportedly sold all his interest in the 
Lexington Law Firm to his employee, John Heath, Lexington had approximately 45,000-55,000 
active credit repair clients. 
13. During the time period of Lawrence's sole ownership, the Lexington Law Firm 
charged those clients who came to it with credit repair concerns an initial fee of $99 and, 
thereafter, a monthly fee of $39. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 94. 
14. The initial fee of $99/client, times 45,000 active clients as of mid-2004, would have 
generated gross income to Lexington of approximately $4,445,000, supplemented by an 
additional monthly income (based on 45,000 clients paying $39/month) of about $1.75 million. 
Assuming 55,000 active clients, the initial fees would have generated initial gross income to 
Lexington of $5,445,000, plus supplemental monthly income of almost $2,15 million. 
15'. Although entitled to all the net profit generated by the Lexington Law Firm, Mr. 
Lawrence chose to pay himself a variable wage which was based, at least in part, on a percentage 
of the income or profit generated by the Lexington Law Firm. 
5 
16. By June, 2004, Mr. Lawrence's earnings, derived principally from Lexington, 
exceeded $30,000 a month. Plaintiffs Exhibit 92. In April, 2004, for example, Mr. Lawrence 
paid himself out of the Lexington Law Firm $37,807.50. In May, 2004, he drew out of the 
Lexington Law Firm income in the amount $39,938.00. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 92 at 22-23. 
According to papers Mr. Lawrence filed in his divorce case in June, 2004, he, as of that time, was 
"receiving income in excess of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) per month." Plaintiffs Exhibit 
92 at 2, 11,20-21, and 70. These figures establish Mr. Lawrence, as of mid-2004, was earning 
$360,000 to $450,000 a year. 
17. Mr. Lawrence was paying at least a portion if not most of the monthly income he* was 
drawing from Lexington to Lupus Lost, the limited liability company which he had formed in 
August, 2000. In fact, two account summaries introduced into evidence, that calculated Mr. 
Lawrence's pay for April and May, 2004 (Plaintiffs Exh. 92, pp. 22-23), were addressed to: 
Victor Lawrence 
Lupus Lost 
Five checks introduced into evidence showed payments by Lexington Law Firm to Lupus 
Lost between the dates of February 9, 2004 and June 7,2004, which was during the period of 
Lawrence's ownership. These five checks to Lupus Lost totaled $91,053.74. Plaintiffs Exhibit 
127. 
18. Mr. Lawrence also paid his wife Cindy Lawrence directly out of Lexington Law Firm. 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 92 at 22. 
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19. According to a paper Lawrence filed in the United States District Court, D. Utah, he 
sold all his interest in Lexington to John Heath on June 23, 2004. According to other testimony it 
may have taken an additional couple of months for the sale and purchase to finally close. 
20. The evidence concerning the amount Heath allegedly paid Lawrence for the multi-
million law Lexington Law practice was inconclusive and inconsistent. Lawrence testified that he 
sold his interest in Lexington for approximately four months of the wages that he was otherwise 
drawing out of Lexington; about, he said, $100,000 to $120,000. Heath, too, recalled that 
Lawrence has sold his ownership of Lexington for four months wages, although he remembered 
that four months wages translated to about $166,000. Heath recalled, though, that this "payment" 
for the business was out of Lexington's proceeds, as a continued wage, rather than a payment by 
Heath to Lawrence. An Asset Purchase Agreement that Lawrence and Heath signed in April, 
2004, provided, contrary to both Lawrence's and Heath's testimony, that the sale and purchase 
price for the Lexington law practice would be the amount of its accounts receivable as of the date 
of closing. Based on the testimony at trial, it is not entirely clear when the sale and purchase of 
Lexington closed. A financial statement for Lexington, as of June 2004, indicated accounts 
receivable that month of $ 119,806.31. 
Based on the testimony at trial, the Court finds that Lawrence received at least $120,000 
to $166,000 for the sale of his interest, although it remains unclear to the court why Lawrence 
would sell his interest in Lexington for a mere four months of wages. 
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21. Although Lawrence testified that he received no consideration other than $120,000 
for the sale of his interest in Lexington, the evidence at trial indicated that he has derived 
ongoing and substantial income from his past association with Lexington. 
22. The Lexington Law Firm after June 23,2004 paid substantial sums to Lawrence or 
entities he owned or controlled. Lexington checks establish that after June 23, 2004 the 
Lexington Law Firm paid Victor Lawrence directly over $65,000: $13,445.85 by several checks 
paid after June 23,2004 but in 2004, and $51,650.00 by a single check on February 2,2006. 
Lexington, on June 2, 2005, also paid $2,585.90 to the Law Offices of Victor Lawrence. 
Lexington Law Firm from August 8,2004 through and including February 8, 2007, paid 
$39,444.55 to Lupus Lost, LC. 
Commencing July 1,2005, Lexington Law Firm began making payments, in addition to 
the previously identified payments, to the North Church Law Firm, a solely owned limited 
liability company that Victor Lawrence organized in late March, 2005 (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 
105). These additional payments by the Lexington Law Firm to Lawrence's North Church Law 
Firm totaled $95,691.11. 
The payments by Lexington to Victor Lawrence, the Law Offices of Victor Lawrence, 
Lupus Lost, LC, and the North Church Law Firm, all made after June 23,2004 total $202,817.41. 
These checks by Lexington to Victor Lawrence or business entities he controlled or solely owned 
establish that Lexington, whether or not the payments are tied to Lawrence's sale of Lexington, 
continued after June 23, 2004 to pay Victor Lawrence for consulting and possibly other services. 
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These continuing Lexington payments, furthermore, represented substantial income to Mr. 
Lawrence which he continued to receive until as recently as a year ago. 
23. The Lexington Law Firm, after June 23,2004, also made four monthly payments of 
$2,500 each directly to Cindy Lawrence, totaling $10,000.00. These post 6/23/04 Lexington 
payments directly to Cindy Lawrence spanned July 15 to November 5, 2004. 
24. Mr. Lawrence owns certain "proprietary Law Firm Marketing Internet Software" 
which, commencing April 30,2004, he leased to John Heath for a variable monthly sum, as 
specified in a separate Software License and Consulting Services Agreement that both Lawrence 
and Heath signed. This written agreement is a separate agreement, apart from the parties' Asset 
Purchase Agreement. The Agreement clearly and unambiguously identifies Mr. Lawrence as the 
owner of the software. 
25. Heath agreed to pay to Lawrence each month a licensing fee of $9.75 for each account 
in which CRS activity was recorded during a usage month. CRS activity, according to Heath, 
referred to any computer entries relative to a client account which indicated activity by Lexington 
in working that account. 
26. Lexington had 45,000 to 55,000 active clients when Heath bought the Lexington law 
practice. Furthermore, Lexington had, as of September 30, 2005, approximately one year later, 
"approximately 38,574 clients for its regular service." Most of these 38,574 accounts would have 
had CRS activity during the month of September, 2005. 
If, hypothetically, 35,000 accounts had CRS activity in September, 2005, then Lawrence's 
and Heath's Agreement specified that Heath was obligated to pay to Lawrence a 
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licensing/consulting fee of $341,250 for that month alone. Even if just half the active accounts 
had CRS activity, royalties due Lawrence for September, 2005 alone would, according to the 
terms of his and Heath's contract, have amounted to $188,048. 
27. Heath or Lexington made payments directly to Victor Lawrence pursuant to Heath's 
and Lawrence's Software License and Consulting Services Agreement through at least January, 
2006. 
28. Lawrence and Heath amended their Software License and Consulting Agreement 
effective as of January 1,2006. The amended agreement lowered the monthly usage fees by six 
cents per account in which there was CRT activity, but otherwise Heath's obligation to pay 
Lawrence licensing/consulting fees continued in effect. 
29. Also about January, 2006, pursuant to another written agreement not introduced into 
evidence and at Lawrence's request, Lexington began making or directing those payments Heath 
was obligated to make per the Software License and Consulting Agreement directly to a company 
identified as Aspenwood, which Heath understood to be a creditor of Mr. Lawrence. Mr. 
Lawrence thus continued to derive an economic benefit from the monthly payments that Heath, at 
Lawrence's instruction, redirected to Aspenwood. 
30. No evidence was introduced to the effect that Mr. Lawrence's and Mr. Heath's 
Software License and Consulting Services Agreement has been terminated. The Agreement itself 
identifies no fixed term after which payments will cease. In any event, the magnitude of Mr. 
Heath's acknowledged monthly obligations under the Agreement, and the duration of time over 
which he or Lexington continued payments either directly to Mr. Lawrence or others at his 
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direction, including to the current time, establish that Mr. Lawrence's ownership of the "Law 
Firm Marketing Internet Software" identified by the Agreements is an asset of considerable and 
substantial value. 
31. No evidence was introduced that Lawrence has disposed of his ownership of the Law 
Firm Internet Software that he, in the course of his April, 2004 agreement with Heath, 
represented that he owned. 
32. Mr. Lawrence testified that he never received royalty or other income from leasing 
software to Heath and that his agreement with Heath was that Heath would take over Lawrence's 
prior obligation to Aspenwood to pay it for having developed the software. The original, written 
agreement which Lawrence signed clearly represented, however, that Lawrence owned the 
software and that he would lease it to Heath. The evidence did not indicate a novation of a 
contract between Lawrence and Aspenwood, and no such proof was offered into evidence. 
Heath, contrary to Lawrence's testimony, recalled that he or Lexington made royalty 
payments in accordance with the contract's terms and its mathematical formula, directly to 
Lawrence until January, 2006; and thereafter to Aspenwood at Lawrence's direction. 
Furthermore, had Lawrence, as he suggested, relinquished his ownership interest in the software 
in return Heath/Lexington assuming a prior obligation to Aspenwood, there would have been no 
reason for Lawrence to sign an Amended Software Agreement almost two years later, effective 
January 1, 2006. That Agreement between Heath and Lawrence amends the amount of the usage 
fee but does not negate John Heath's obligation to continue the payment of royalty fees to Victor 
Lawrence or his assignee, 
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33. Mr. Heath conceded that Lexington may very well have made payments to third 
parties other than Aspenwood, at Victor Lawrence's direction, that were not included in the 
Lexington checks that were produced by Heath at trial. 
34. Victor Lawrence on June 7,2004, filed a petition for divorce in Davis County in 
which he sought to terminate his marriage with Cindy Lawrence. The divorce was uncontested 
and Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence consented and stipulated to a division of property, wrhich was 
memorialized in Findings of Fact and a Divorce Decree. Trial Exhibit 92. The Decree of Divorce 
was entered July 13, 2004. 
35. The Decree of Divorce awarded Mr. Lawrence any and all interest in a World Mark 
Vacation Property ownership. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 92 at 76. When questioned about this asset, Mr. 
Lawrence contended he had not really been awarded the World Mark Vacation Property but that 
instead it had been at all times owned by one of his daughters. The Court finds Mr. Lawrence's 
explanation to be disingenuous, as there would have been no reason to identify the World Mark 
ownership as a marital asset to be awarded to one spouse or the other, if it was owned by one of 
the Lawrence's adult children. Victor and Cindy Lawrence identified the World Mark Property 
ownership as a marital asset and asked the court to award it to Mr. Lawrence, which the Court 
did. No testimony was elicited concerning the value of this asset. Nonetheless, it is an asset that 
the Davis County court in 2004 awarded to Mr. Lawrence. 
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36. The Decree of Divorce also awarded to Mr. Lawrence all interest in several 
companies he had "or may acquire an interest in," including Far Cliffs Media, LLC and the 
Bobby Lawrence Karate Training Center. 
37. Mr. Lawrence testified that Far Cliffs Media was one of Lexington's vendors at the 
time he owned Lexington, but that he had not acquired an ownership interest in Far Cliffs Media 
at the time of his divorce and had not since acquired any interest. 
38. Mr. Lawrence, however, in response to questioning on the first day of trial admitted 
that Far Cliffs Media and another company, RevGen, had paid him consulting fees over an 
unspecified period of time in the amount of $25,000 - $35,000 per month up through and 
including February, 2008. Lawrence testified, however, that Far Cliffs and RevGen had informed 
him that neither intended to make any additional payments after March 1, 2008. 
39. Subpoenaed witness Mark Jensen testified on the second day of trial that the 
payments made by Far Cliffs Media and Rev Gen to Victor Lawrence for consulting services 
regularly amounted to $35,000 a month. According to Mr. Jensen, Mr. Lawrence received 
$35,000 in the month preceding the trial, February 2008: $20,000 in the middle of the month and 
$15,000 at the end of the month. Furthermore, according to Jensen, Far Cliffs and/or Rev Gen 
had paid to Mr. Lawrence about $35,000 in January, 2008, in December, 2007 and in every 
preceding month back through and including all of 2005. Jensen furthermore recalled these 
regular monthly payments, including the payments in January and February 2008, being made to 
Lawrence's solely owned North Church Law Firm and to Lupus Lost, LC. 
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40. Jensen was not aware that Far Cliffs, as Lawrence testified, had decided to cease its 
monthly payments to Lawrence effective March 1, 2008. Jensen, who is the person who prepares 
the checks each month, said that neither Far Cliffs or RevGen had instructed him to cease their 
monthly payments to Lawrence. Jensen expected in the next couple of da)'s to receive 
instructions directing him to make to Mr Lawrence the regular mid-month payment in the 
amount of $20,000. 
41. Mr. Jensen's testimony of regular monthly payments of $35,000/month by Far Cliffs 
and RevGen to companies and former companies that Mr. Lawrence owns and controls belies 
and contradicts Mr. Lawrence's protestation to the court that he is bereft of income. Payments of 
$35,000/month amount to $420,000/year. Moreover, this is in addition to the aforementioned 
payments to Lawrence by Lexington. 
42. Although some of the substantial sums of money paid by Far Cliffs and RevGen to 
the North Church Law Firm, a limited liability company, may have gone for expenses and thus 
not reached Mr. Lawrence's pockets, the court concludes most of it must have. Mr. Lawrence, 
first, introduced no evidence concerning his expenses that would have reduced North Church's 
income to which Lawrence, as its sole member, would be entitled. Furthermore, the evidence 
indicated that North Church has had only one client (Far Cliffs), has only one employee, and 
offices in a Bountiful apartment that Lawrence earlier identified as his residence. The overhead 
of the North Church Law Firm does not appear to be significant, which suggests that most of the 
monthly income from Far Cliffs or RevGen would be attributed as income to Mr. Lawrence. 
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43. Although Mr. Lawrence admitted that he had on occasion worked as an instructor at 
the Bobby Lawrence Karate studios, he claimed never to have been paid for his services and 
claimed to have derived no income from the studios. He also disclaimed ownership, contending 
that the Bobby Lawrence Karate studios were owned by members of his immediate family, 
apparently his children. The Court finds this explanation, too, to be disingenuous. First, the 
divorce decree awarded all ownership interest in the Bobby Lawrence karate studios to Mr. 
Lawrence and it seems most unlikely that the divorce papers, which Mr. Lawrence prepared, 
would have asked that he be awarded the interest in a business neither he or Cindy owned. 
Furthermore, a business name registration for "Bobby Lawrence Karate" filed with the state of 
Utah on March 15,2005, which Mr. Lawrence prepared and signed, named as the applicant and 
owner of the business, Lupus Lost, LC. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 104. Mr. Lawrence signed for 
Lupus Lost as its "managing director." The address given for Lupus Lost, LC, furthermore, 
matches the address Lawrence gave for the Bountiful apartment in which he said he lives. For the 
purpose of assessing punitive damages, the Court finds that Lupus Lost, LC, for which Lawrence 
was its managing member, owned Bobby Lawrence Karate studios at least as of March 15, 2005. 
There was no evidence received that Lupus Lost subsequently sold its interest in the Bobby 
Lawrence Karate studios, for value or otherwise. 
43. The business name registration for "Bobby Lawrence Karate," plaintiffs Exhibit 104, 
also contradicts Mr. Lawrence's sworn statement that Lupus Lost, LC never owned any assets. 
44. Mr. Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence sought to establish their impecuniosity by 
claiming that they owed the Internal Revenue Service over $700,000, a debt they apparently 
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incurred because of their failure to timely file federal income tax returns (including for the time 
period that Mr. Lawrence owned and operated the Lexington Law Firm as a sole proprietorship). 
45. Both Victor Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence testified as to efforts by the IRS to find 
and seize their income and assets. Cindy Lawrence testified that as a consequence of the IRS's 
collection efforts, she keeps no money in her bank accounts and cashes all checks she receives, 
including child support payments by Victor Lawrence, to keep the IRS from getting the money. 
46. Mr. Lawrence expressed his willingness and intention to shut down his North Church 
Law Firm law practice in order to prevent the IRS from seizing the income flowing into that 
business. 
47. Notwithstanding the IRS's liens, Victor Lawrence has assured Cindy that he will 
resolve and pay the liens. 
48. Cindy Lawrence claims to have no income and claims to own no assets. She claims 
total ignorance concerning Victor Lawrence's past and present business dealings and financial 
condition. She claims to know nothing about Hawaiian Investments, LC or PCP, LC, even 
though she signed papers filed with the State of Utah in her capacity of managing member of 
both companies. She claims to know nothing about Lupus Lost, LC, even though Hawaiian 
Investments, LC and PCP, LC were both members of Lupus Lost and even though Lupus Lost 
received substantial income from the Lexington Law Firm, Far Cliffs Media, and RevGen, and 
even though she lived with Lupus' managing director until she and Victor divorced. Although 
Cindy Lawrence received from Victor Lawrence alimony of $5,000/month for about a year after 
the divorce until she remarried, and was at the time of trial still receiving from Victor Lawrence 
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monthly child support payments, she claims never to have noticed on what bank accounts the 
checks she was given for alimony and child support were drawn. The Court finds these 
protestations of total unabated ignorance not credible and disingenuous. 
49. Wayne Wong testified that he was retired, his prior employment by L-3 
Communications having been terminated about two years ago. Wong claimed to have no 
employment income, and no earnings of any significance from other sources, except for rental 
income. 
50. Wayne Wong owns residential property located at 7194 South 2370 West, West 
Jordan, Utah, in which he used to live. Mr. Wong estimated that the West Jordan property had a 
value of approximately $250,000, against which he said is a mortgage in the amount of about 
$200,000. 
51. Wong rents out the West Jordan property, which generates a monthly income to Mr. 
Wong of about $ 1600/month. 
52. Despite that Mr. Wong filed bankruptcy in September, 2003, under Chapter 7, on 
April 26,2006 he purchased a second home located at 14104 South Stone Canyon Drive, Draper, 
Utah, in which he and his wife, at the time of the trial, still lived. 
53. Mr. Wong purchased the home at 14104 South Stone Canyon Drive for $540,000. 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 108, 109. 
54. Mr. Wong borrowed the $540,000 purchase price. Plaintiffs Exhibits 111,112. 
55. Eight months later, in December, 2006, Wong refinanced the Stone Canyon Drive 
property, borrowing $630,000, secured by two new trust deeds on the property. Plaintiffs 
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Exhibits 113,114. The refinancing produced about $50,000 cash to Mr. Wong, after the original 
first and second mortgages were paid, and after a prepayment penalty. 
56. When examined by Intermountain concerning the Stone Canyon Drive property, Mr. 
Wong initially denied the he owned the property, denied that he, personally, had borrowed the 
$540,000 purchase price, and denied that he had refinanced the property in December, 2006. 
Wong initially maintained that the Stone Canyon Drive property was owned by a limited liability 
company in which he had been promised a minority interest as consideration for his cooperation 
in helping a "Mr. Casey," who he also identified as Casey Hall, purchase the property. 
Intermountain, however, entered into evidence a warranty deed clearly showing conveyance of 
the Stone Canyon Drive property by Robert J. Ryan to Wayne Wong on April 24,2006. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 108. Wong subsequently acknowledged his signature on two trust deeds 
encumbering the property dated April, 2006 (Plaintiffs Exhibits 111 and 112) and two 
subsequent trust deeds encumbering the property dated December, 2006 (Plaintiffs Exhibits 113 
and 114). 
57. Wong explained that his involvement in the Stone Canyon Drive property was at the 
request of Mr. Casey, who asked him to sign whatever papers were needed in order for the 
limited liability company to buy the home. In return, Wong understood he would receive a 
minority interest in the company and that he and his wife could live rent free in the home. 
According to Wong, Mr, Casey or the limited liability company was supposed to make all the 
mortgage payments, which they for a while did by advancing the monthly mortgage payment to 
Wong, who then paid the lender. 
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58. Mr, Wong turned over to Mr. Casey the $50,000 he took out of the Stone Canyon 
Drive property by refinancing it in December, 2006. 
59. When Mr. Casey, about April 2007, stopped advancing the mortgage payments to 
Wong, the monthly mortgage payments to the lender ceased. Mr. Wong did not make them and 
perceived he had no personal obligation to make them. The mortgages Wong executed in 
December, 2006 are presently in default. 
60. Mr. Wong is the owner of a business named "Ourmart Enterprises," which Mr. Wong 
about October 11, 2005 registered with the state of Utah as a "dba" that he and his wife, Maria, 
owned. 
61. Mr. Wong, notwithstanding his initial denial, signed, in his personal capacity, a 
residential loan application when he refinanced the Stone Canyon Drive property in December, 
2006. Plaintiffs Exhibit 121. In his application, Wong represented that he was self-employed, 
that he owned Ourmart Enterprises, that he had been employed by Ourmart for 15 years, and that 
Ourmart's address was 14104 South Stone Canyon Road, Draper, Utah. Wong furthermore 
represented to the lender that his monthly income from Ourmart was $14,981.00. 
62. Wong, in signing the application, certified that his representations were truthful 
subject to criminal penalties under federal law. 
63. Assuming to be true Mr. Wong's representation that he had/has income of $14,981.00 
a month from Ourmart, that would translate to annual earnings of nearly $180,000 a year. Such 
earnings would be probative in the court's decision of what amount to assess as punitive 
damages against Mr. Wong. 
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64. Mr. Wong, however, insisted that his representation concerning income, as stated in 
the Residential Loan Application, was untrue, that he had almost no earnings from Ourmart 
Enterprises. Mr. Wong explained that he did not provide the employment and earnings 
information in the residential loan application, that it was Mr. Casey who misrepresented his 
earnings to be $14,981/month, that he did not read the residential loan application before signing 
it, and that he signed the application without reading it because Mr. Casey instructed him to sign 
it. Signing whatever documents Mr. Casey put before him to sign was, according to Wong, part 
of what he was expected to do in return for being permitted to live in the home and for a 
percentage in Mr. Casey's limited liability company. 
65. Following the first stage of trial, the court entered an Order restraining Mr. Wong and 
Victor and Cindy Lawrence from conveying, without the court's permission, interests in real 
property. Notwithstanding this express Order, Intermountain introduced into evidence a 
"Warranty Deed to Trustee" signed by Wayne Wong, which was dated January 29, 2008 and 
recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder on February 6, 2008. Plaintiffs Exhibit 120. The 
terms of the Warranty Deed to Trustee provided that Mr. Wong conveyed his interest in the 
Stone Canyon Drive property "unto Burntol, LC as Trustee and not personally under the 
provisions of a trust agreement dated the 29th day of January, 2008, known as the Wong Draper 
Family Land Trust...'5 
66. Mr. Wong, when initially questioned concerning his conveyance of real property in 
January or February, 2008, denied he had conveyed any real property. When shown his notarized 
signature on the warranty deed dated January 29, 2008, however, he acknowledged that the 
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signature was his. Even so, Mr. Wong claimed to have no recollection or knowledge of having 
been a party to a trust agreement known as the Wong Draper Family Land Trust dated January 
29, 2008, no knowledge that he had conveyed the Stone Canyon Drive property to Burntol, LC as 
Trustee, and no knowledge or understanding why he did or would have done so. Wong explained 
that any and all documents he signed on January 29, 2008 were at someone else's, presumably 
Mr. Casey's direction. Even assuming Mr. Wong's explanation is true, his execution of the 
Warranty Deed and the resulting conveyance to Burntol, LC as Trustee violated the court's 
express order not to convey interests in real property absent notice to the court and its 
permission, 
67. It is not clear what Mr. Wong was attempting to accomplish by his conveyance of the 
Stone Canyon Drive property, in large part because Mr. Wong either could not explain or refused 
to explain the purpose of the Wong Draper Family Land Trust that apparently was also created 
and established on January 29,2008. In any event, Mr. Wong's execution of the warranty deed 
on January 29, 2008, the conveyance of property, and the recording of the deed on February 6, 
2008, evidence and establish Mr. Wong's disrespect for this court's orders and his unwillingness 
to abide by them. 
LAW APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS 
1. Punitive damages are warranted in cases where "the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor 
are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that 
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others." 
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(1). 
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2. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter reprehensible, outrageous or 
malicious conduct, or conduct which manifests a knowing or reckless indifference toward and 
disregard of the rights of others, which is not likely to be deterred by other means. Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 807 & 811 (Utah 1991); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching 
Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah 1885). 
3. Punitive damages are appropriate in cases where defendants have been found liable for 
fraud. See e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P.2d 789. 
4. Punitive damages are also appropriate in cases where defendants have been found 
liable for conversion. See e.g., Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59; Bennett v. 
Hmsh,2007UTAppl9. 
5. A trial court, in determining the quantum of punitive damages to be assessed against a 
defendant should, according to Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 
1991), consider the following seven factors: (1) the relative wealth of the defendant; (2) the 
nature of the alleged misconduct; (3) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (4) 
the effect thereof on the Uves of the plaintiff and others; (5) the probabiUty of future recurrence 
of the misconduct; (6) the relationship of the parties; and (7) the amount of actual damages 
awarded. 
6. No relative weights, however, are assigned or have been assigned to the seven factors 
identified by Crookston. Id. at 808. None of the factors are more conclusive or more important 
than another. Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89 ^49, reversed 
and remanded, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
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7. The seven factors are guidelines and not elements to be proven, and the absence of one 
of the factors in a given case does not mean that punitive damages are unwarranted. See e.g.. Hall 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, 959 P.2d 109 (Utah 1998) (plaintiffs failure to introduce any evidence 
concerning defendant's wealth did not preclude an award of punitive damages). 
8. "Deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, [and] concealment of 
evidence of improper motive support more substantial awards ..., as do acts involving 'trickery 
and deceit.'" Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT 41, f 35 (quoting BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, 217 U.S. 559, 576, 579). 
9. "Behaviors that undermine the efficiency and integrity of the judicial process may also 
be considered under the rubric of the second Crookston factor [nature of the alleged 
misconduct]." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT 41, n. 15; Diversified Holdings v. Turner, 2002 
UT 129,1fl7; see Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89,11f30-3l. This principle 
of law is particularly germane to Victor Lawrence. 
10. A cavalier, arrogant, or uncaring attitude exhibited by a defendant with regard to his 
wrongful conduct, or the damages he has caused a plaintiff may indicate that the defendant is 
likely to again engage in substantially similar conduct absent the deterrent effect of a punitive 
damage award. Diversified Holdings v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, f21. The Utah Supreme Court 
observed in the Campbell case, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, that "State 
Farm's obdurate insistence that its treatment of the Campbells was proper clearly calls out for 
vigorous deterrence." Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 2004 UT 34, f33. 
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11. Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages. Crookston 
v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991). 
12. The Utah Supreme Court in the Crookston case, based on a review of Utah case law 
up to that time, laid down a general guideline concerning the appropriate ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages. Crookston. 817 P.2d at 810. According to Crookston. a ratio of more 
than 3 to 1 is presumptively excessive where the punitive damage award is less than $100,000. 
Where the punitive damage award is in excess of $100,000, the Supreme Court stated, "we have 
indicated some inclination to overturn awards having ratios of less than 3 to 1." The Supreme 
Court noted that up to that point in time, it was seldom that it had been asked to review punitive 
damage awards greater than $100,000. 
13. Crookston. however, does not preclude an award of punitive damages in excess of the 
prior observed ratios, if warranted by the facts and circumstances in a particular case. In the 
Crookston case itself, the trial court on remand upheld an award of punitive damages in the 
amount of $4 million, which exceeded compensatory damages by a factor of 5. Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exchange. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993) (affirming trial court's justification for awarding 
punitive damages 5 times the amount of compensatory damages). In Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 
2003 UT 41, ft 44-48, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's award of $5.5 million in 
punitive damages, which exceeded compensatory damages by a factor of 5.5 to 1. In Campbell v. 
State Farm, the Utah Supreme Court, on remand by the United States Supreme Court, determined 
that punitive damages of just over $9 million, equal to nine times compensatory damages, was 
appropriate. Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins.. 2004 UT 34. 
24 
14. A high ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is not by itself 
determinative of excessiveness. Diversified Holdings, LC v. Turner. 2002 UT 129 at [^24. 
15. Where, however, an award of punitive damages exceeds the presumptive guidelines 
observed in Crookston, a trial court judge "must make a detailed and reasoned articulation of the 
grounds for concluding that the award is not excessive in light of law and the facts." This 
articulation should generally be couched in terms of one of more of the aforementioned seven 
factors "unless some other factor seems compelling to the trial court." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 
811. 
16. "An award that is presumptively excessive may be justified by an explanation of why 
the case is unique, usually in terms of one of the established seven factors." Bennett v. Huish. 
2007 UT App. 19atn. 11. 
17. "A defendant's wealth can either be an aggravating or a mitigating factor in 
determining the size of a punitive damage award." Diversified Holdings, LC v. Tuner, 2002 UT 
129115, 63 P.3d 686. 
18. If the punitive damages to be assessed against a particular defendant are under 
$100,000, and are less than three times the amount of compensatory damages, it will be 
"presumed that the award of punitive damages is not excessive and no evidence of relative 
wealth is required to sustain the award." Bennett v. Huish. 2007 UT App 19 at [^38 (emphasis 
added); see also Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 109, 113 (Utah 1998) (holding that a 
plaintiffs failure to introduce any evidence concerning a defendant's wealth does not preclude an 
award of punitive damages). This principle of law is particularly germane to Cindy Lawrence. 
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19. Victor and Cindy Lawrence direct the Court's attention to BMW of North America, 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1966), which established guidelines for deciding 
whether punitive damages awarded by a state court are so large that they violate the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Gore, the United States 
Supreme Court announced three guideposts for determining whether punitive damages awarded 
in a particular case exceed that permitted by due process. The three guideposts identified by Gore 
include (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, (2) the disparity between 
the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damage award; and (3) the 
difference between the punitive damages awarded and civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases. 
20. Utah, since Gore, continues to use and apply the seven Crookston factors 
"recognizing that they substantially reflect the Supreme Court's directives and modifying them as 
necessary to fully meet the federal requirements." Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.. 
2004UT34,1f20. 
21. The "reprehensibility" criterion corresponds to the second Crookston factor, "nature 
of defendant's conduct." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT 41,135. This criterion is "the most 
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damage award." State Farm Mutual Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell. 528 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). Fraud and deceit rank high on the federal, 
reprehensibility scale. BMW of North America. Inc. v. Gore, 217 U.S. 559, 576, 579 (1966). 
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22. Gore, like Crookston, holds that punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship 
to compensatory damages. This second Gore criterion corresponds to the Crookston seventh 
criterion. 
23. The third Gore criterion is unique to the federal analysis. Its application and interface 
with Utah law is discussed in detail by the Utah Supreme Court in Campbell v. State Farm 
Mutual Ins. Co., 2004 UT 34, fl42-46. The most analogous civil penalty for a fraud claim, 
payable by a natural person, would likely be a $2,500 fine. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-301(l)(c). As 
natural persons, though, Victor Lawrence, Cindy Lawrence, and Wayne Wong could also face 
jail time, on which is more difficult to place a monetary value for comparison purposes. This 
search for an analogous civil penalty also does not mandate a one-to-one correspondence. Even 
the U.S. Supreme Court, as the Utah Supreme Court noted in Campbell. 2004 UT 34, f 43, 
implicitly endorsed a punitive damage award that exceeded the most analogous Utah civil 
penalty by a ratio of 100 to 1. The Utah Supreme Court, in Campbell id., approved a punitive 
damage award that exceeded the most analogous civil penalty by a factor of 900 to 1, rejecting an 
argument that that ratio offended the 14th Amendment. 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, a trial court charged with the task of awarding 
punitive damages should consider and weigh the seven factors identified in Crookston. The Court 
now considers those factors, as to each of the three defendants, 
Victor Lawrence 
(a). Relative wealth of the Defendant: 
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It is difficult to determine with any exactness Mr. Lawrence's wealth, measured by assets 
or income, for the very reason that he has tried hard over the past several years to disguise and 
hide the amount and sources of his income, including from the Internal Revenue Service. Mr. 
Lawrence has also been less then candid concerning his assets and income. In this trial, for 
example, he claimed that Lupus Lost had no assets, although it at least owned the Bobby 
Lawrence Karate Studio when it in 2005 filed a dba application for Bobby Lawrence Karate. Mr. 
Lawrence, for example, claimed he had never owned a World Mark vacation ownership, 
although he asked a Davis County Court in a divorce proceeding to award this marital asset to 
him. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Lawrence's lack of candor, and notwithstanding his hollow 
protestations of poverty, it is apparent that he has since at least the early 2000s received 
substantial income, far and above what would be considered average annual income. In mid 
2004, Mr. Lawrence's income approached $40,000/month, derived primarily from his ownership 
of the Lexington Law Firm. Far Cliffs Media and RevGen have, since sometime in 2005 or 
before, regularly and faithfully paid Lawrence $35,000 per month in consulting fees, which have 
continued at least through February, 2008. Lexington paid Lawrence additional sums for his 
consulting services, amounting to more than $200,000 (or about $50,000 per year on average) 
since Lawrence ostensibly sold Lexington to John Heath in June, 2004. 
In addition, Mr. Lawrence also owns at least one significant asset, consisting of software, 
the licensing of which has generated huge if unspecified royalty income to Mr. Lawrence. 
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What is known about Mr. Lawrence's income and wealth, including his ownership of at 
least the one asset of substantial value, warrants a significant award of punitive damages. 
(b) Nature of the Alleged Conduct and 
(c) Facts and Circumstances Surrounding such Conduct: 
Victor Lawrence conspired with Paul Schwenke, Wayne Wong, and Cindy Lawrence to 
defraud fritermountain. Their purpose was to obtain the possession and use of vehicles without 
paying, with Wayne Wong fronting as the lessee in return for a payment to him in the amount of 
$10,000. It was a scheme that the Schwenkes and Lawrences appear to have perpetrated before, 
against West Valley Dodge. 
Fraud, or in the case of Victor Lawrence, conspiracy to defraud, is a particularly 
egregious form of wrongdoing, as it involves intentional deceit calculated to obtain a financial 
advantage over another. The goal of the conspiracy to defraud, in this case, was to acquire the 
free use of vehicles from a motor vehicle dealer and/or leasing company. Lawrence and the 
others engaged in conduct calculated to enable the conspirators to use the vehicles for as long as 
possible, to the extent even of ignoring court orders compelling discovery of their location and 
directing that the vehicles be returned to Intennountain. 
Punitive damages are also warranted in cases of conversion. Mr. Lawrence and his family 
enjoyed the free use of the black Rodeo for almost nine months under circumstances where Mr. 
Lawrence, who is an attorney, knew he had no lawful right to possess or use it. Lawrence knew 
that Wayne Wong had leased the black and other Rodeos, but that he had not been making the 
monthly lease payments. Lawrence, knowing this, made none of the lease payments and paid 
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nothing for his and his family's use of the black Rodeo. He paid nothing for its use, even though 
his income from Lexington comfortably enabled him to purchase or lease a vehicle without resort 
to fraud and deceit. He continued to drive the black Rodeo and use it for free even though he 
knew that the leases between Intermountain's assignees and Wong had been in default almost 
half a year. 
On Intermountain's repurchase of the black Rodeo from Bank of America, and its 
repurchase of the lease contract with Wayne Wong, Inteimountain had the right to repossess the 
vehicle. Mr. Lawrence, as an attorney, knew this. Certainly, Lawrence knew that he had no right 
to possess the vehicle. 
Intermountain attempted to repossess the black Rodeo on January 31,2001, in a parking 
garage adjacent to the building in which Lexington's office was located. Lawrence, however, 
thwarted Intermountain's recovery of the vehicle. Not only did Lawrence object to 
Intermountain's effort to repossess the vehicle, he, without cause or justification, attacked and 
assaulted Intermountain's owner, G. Thomas Watkins, causing minor physical injury. 
Having personally and intentionally thwarted Intermountain's repossession attempt, 
Lawrence turned possession of the black Rodeo over to Paul Schwenke. He did so, knowing that 
(1) Wayne Wong, not Schwenke had leased the black Rodeo; (2) that Wong had made no 
monthly lease payments; and (3) that the lease agreement on the black Rodeo was in default. 
Schwenke had no right to the black Rodeo. Lawrence knew that Schwenke had no right to 
possess and use the black Rodeo but turned the black Rodeo over to him anyway. 
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Schwenke had the black Rodeo driven to Southern California, where it was thereafter 
used and driven by Schwenke's relatives. Not surprisingly, Schwenke and his relatives adhered to 
their belief that they were somehow privileged to drive for free the vehicles leased from 
Intermountain. Schwenke's daughter, Tania, who unknown to Intermountain apparently resided 
in Las Vegas, continued to use and drive the green Rodeo. Schwenke's in-laws, once in 
possession of the black Rodeo, continued to drive it until Schwenke's brother-in-law totaled it in 
an accident. 
This action was filed by Wong, Cindy Lawrence and Wilma Schwenke, Paul's wife. 
Their initial attorney, Jamis Johnson, withdrew as their counsel about February, 2001. 
Intermountain named Victor Lawrence as a defendant on a Third Party Complaint, filed in April, 
2001. Notwithstanding that he had been named as a defendant, Mr. Lawrence entered an 
appearance on behalf of not only he and his wife, but also Wayne Wong and Paul, Wilma and 
Tania Schwenke. At the very least, his appearance on behalf of these multiple defendants, 
including himself, constituted a massive conflict of interest. 
Once Mr. Lawrence undertook to represent all the counterclaim and third party 
defendants, he used his knowledge as an attorney and of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 
furtherance of the conspiracy to defraud Intermountain, and to stonewall hitermountain's effort to 
locate and retrieve the two remaining Rodeos.1 He immediately, on the defendants' behalf, 
!Intermountain repossessed the silver Rodeo from Paul Schwenke's garage in Kanosh, 
Utah on Thanksgiving eve, 2000. The Millard County Sheriff repossessed the silver Rodeo 
pursuant to an ex parte writ of replevin signed by Judge Iwasaki in case no. 000909209, which 
was later consolidated with this case. 
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improperly removed this case to the United States District Court, which bought Tania Schwenke 
and Paul Schwenke's relatives another three months of free use. Defendants were sanctioned for 
their improper removal to federal court. Wayne Wong, who later paid the sanction, testified that 
Lawrence never informed him that the case had been removed or that sanctions had been 
assessed. 
It appears that Victor Lawrence never told his clients and co-defendants (save maybe Paul 
Schwenke), that the Court had entered an Order compelling answers to Intermountain's 
Interrogatories, which sought to discover the location of the remaining two vehicles. Cindy 
Lawrence, to the limited extent her testimony may be believable, represented that Victor 
Lawrence had advised her that she need not answer the interrogatories because she was no longer 
a party. 
Orders were entered in the Fall of 2001 ruling that Intermountain was entitled to 
immediate possession of the black and green Rodeos, that none of the defendants were entitled to 
possession of any of the Rodeos, and that defendants were ordered to immediately surrender and 
return the green and black Rodeos to Intermountain. Still, the remaining two vehicles continued 
to be used and driven, Intermountain continued to be kept in the dark about where they were, and 
Mr. Lawrence continued to represent members of the Schwenke family as well as Wong, his 
wife, and himself. No one, including Wong, made any lease payments. Only when an Order was 
entered holding all defendants other than Victor Lawrence in contempt of court, did Tania and 
Paul Schwenke drive the green Rodeo, beat up and damaged, to Salt Lake City. Only then did 
defendants surrender the vehicle to Intermountain. The black Rodeo was eventually returned to 
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Salt Lake City from Southern California, on a flat bed truck, inoperable, smashed and shorter 
than before. 
Until they were facing jail time for contempt of court, Lawrence apparently made no 
effort to have his co-defendants and clients surrender the remaining Rodeos to Intermountain. 
Nor did he have them respond to delinquent discovery and Orders to compel discovery that 
sought the location of the remaining vehicles. Instead, he incorrectly told at least some of 
defendants that they had no obligation to respond. 
Victor Lawrence's representation of his co-defendants transcended defending them, 
consistent with the Rules of Professional Responsibility. Lawrence used his knowledge of the 
court system to purposefully forestall Intermountain's effort to recover its vehicles, even after 
entry of the Orders that directed that the vehicles be surrendered to Intermountain. 
(d) Effect of Conduct on the Lives of Others 
Victor Lawrence's, Cindy Lawrence's, and Wayne Wong's conduct caused Intermountain 
to sustain compensatory damages, exclusive of attorneys fees, in the sum of $80,412.87. With 
prejudgment interest added, Intermountain's damages amounted to $138,267.25 as of August 13, 
2007. It is obvious that Intermountain has, in addition, incurred substantial attorneys fees, for 
which the court, given the status of the law on attorneys fees, has not awarded to Intermountain 
as damages. While defendants' conduct has without question caused Intermountain to absorb a 
significant financial hit, Intermountain has survived and there is no evidence that this instance 
impaired Intermountain's ability to function or continue as a motor vehicle dealer. 
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(e) The probability of future misconduct. 
The evidence at trial strongly suggested that Lawrence and Schwenke had orchestrated a 
similar fraud before, involving a straw purchaser other than Wong. It was within thirty days after 
First Security Bank repossessed vehicles for nonpayment, including one in the possession of 
Victor and Cindy Lawrence, that Schwenke and the Lawrences offered Wong $10,000 to sign 
leases for them and showed up at Intermountain to negotiate leases on replacement vehicles. In 
the First Security Case, a person other than Wong had signed several contracts as purchaser, 
although he was in possession of none of the vehicles. The incident with Intermountain was not a 
one time play. 
Mr. Lawrence furthermore has exhibited no regret or remorse for bis conduct in this case. 
He is wholly unrepentant. He denies that he has done anything wrong or improper. 
According to Mr. Lawrence, he could not have acted other than as he did without 
breaching his fiduciary duty to Paul Schwenke. Mr Lawrence's justification for his conduct is 
unpersuasive and disingenuous. To the contrary, the Court concludes that Lawrence purposely 
engaged in a conspiracy to defraud, used a vehicle for free under circumstances where he had no 
right to its possession, and did everything he could for as long as he could in contravention of the 
court's orders to make sure Intermountain was not able to recover the remaining vehicles. 
The evidence that surfaced in the March 10-11 phase of trial regarding Victor Lawrence's 
assets and income furthermore establish beyond doubt that Mr. Lawrence, as the owner and 
manager of the Lexington Law Firm, clearly had the resources to buy or lease a new Isuzu 
Rodeo. He did not need to resort to or participate in a fraudulent scheme in order to obtain a 
34 
vehicle to drive. But he did. His willing participation in such a scheme and his advancement of it 
once involved, greatly perplexes the court. The only explanation the Court can conceive for Mr. 
Lawrence's participation in and advancement of such a scheme, given his ownership of 
Lexington and the income that produced, is that Lawrence viewed the scheme as a game which 
he thought he and Paul Schwenke could win. This is precisely the kind of attitude that warrants 
punishment, to deter Mr. Lawrence from choosing to play a similar game in the future. Only by 
making the cost of the game potentially too expensive to comfortably bear, is Mr. Lawrence 
likely to be deterred from engaging in similar future conduct. 
(f) Relationships of the Parties. 
The heinousness of wrongful conduct is even more so when the victim of such conduct 
pecuUarly trusting, vulnerable, perhaps even incapable of protecting himself. Intermountain is a 
corporation. As such, it is not as vulnerable to wrongdoing as, say, a medically incapacitated 
person might be. There was, in this case, no special relationship between Intermountain and 
defendants. 
Even a corporation involved in an arms length transaction with natural persons, is not, 
however, fair game in the game of fraud that Victor Lawrence, Paul Schwenke, Wayne Wong, 
and Cindy Lawrence chose to play. Banks, lenders, and motor vehicle dealers, for example, 
justifiably rely on the presumed truth of statements made in credit applications and contracts in 
deciding to extend credit, or lease vehicles. In this case, Intermountain nonetheless checked 
Wayne Wong's credit history. It is not reasonable, however, to expect Intermountain to have 
asked Wong if he really intended to make the monthly lease payments that he said he would 
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make, or if he intended to give other persons the cars to drive - knowing all along that he 
intended to make none of the monthly payments. Certainly, Jntermountain, even though it is a 
corporation, could not be expected to have known that the Schwenkes and Lawrences had 
promised Wong $10,000 if he would permit them to use his good credit to lease multiple 
vehicles, for their use, in his name. 
Intermountain's status as a corporation does not, as Victor and Cindy Lawrence argue, 
excuse the wrongfulness of their conduct or immunize them from punitive damages. 
(g) The Amount of Damages Awarded. 
The court previously found that Intermountain sustained compensatory damages in the 
amount of $80,412.87, caused by the defendants' fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and/or 
conversion. Prejudgment interest added $57,854.38 to that sum, as of August 13, 2007. See 
Minute Entry (September 20,2007). The total compensatory damages awarded by the court thus 
totaled, as of August 13, 2007, $138,267.15. Punitive damages should, as the court has 
previously noted, bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages commensurate with a party's 
wrongdoing, consistent with the seven factors identified by the Crookston decision. 
Victor and Cindy Lawrence deny that they did anything wrong, but if the court thinks they 
did, argue that any punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the benefit they 
received which they say is the free use of a single vehicle for eight months. That, however, is not 
the applicable relationship, which is the ratio of punitive damages to the harm they caused. The 
harm they caused, measured by monetary damages, is $138,267.15. This is the figure to be used 
in the denominator in any calculation of ratios. 
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On this point, the court notes that Victor Lawrence could have significantly mitigated his 
and the other defendants' damages had he surrendered the black Rodeo to Intermountain on 
January 30, 2001, because at that point the vehicle was still in good condition and had value. 
Instead, he gave the black Rodeo to Schwenke, covered for Schwenke as long as he could, and 
when Intermountain finally retrieved the black Rodeo it had been totaled. In the condition 
Schwenke returned it, Intermountain was able to get only $1,200 on its sale of the black Rodeo. 
(h) Other Considerations. 
When an attorney is admitted to practice law in this state, he takes an oath to uphold the 
law. Mr. Lawrence's conduct in this case was wholly inconsistent with that pledge. Mr. 
Lawrence's status as an attorney, in the court's view, makes much worse his participation in this 
matter and in a conspiracy to defraud. 
(i) Award of Punitive Damages. 
Victor Lawrence's conduct caused Intermountain to sustain financial damages that, with 
prejudgment interest but exclusive of attorneys fees and court costs, amounted to $138,267.25 as 
of August 13, 2007. The court concludes that punitive damages, to be awarded in favor of 
Intermountain and against Victor Lawrence, properly should be in the amount $<tfp¥ tr&~d . 
Cindy Lawrence 
(a) Relative Wealth 
Cindy Lawrence is even more secretive and evasive concerning her assets than is her 
former husband. According to Cindy Lawrence, she is not employed, has no income and has no 
assets. 
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Cindy Lawrence admitted having a bank account, but says she cashes all checks she 
receives rather than depositing them to her account in order to keep the IRS from seizing 
proceeds in the account. 
Cindy Lawrence claimed to have no knowledge concerning any of the businesses in 
which her former husband had or has an interest. Nonetheless, she signed papers presented to the 
state of Utah representing herself to be a member and manager of Hawaiiain Investments, LC and 
PCP, LC, both of which were members in Lupus Lost, LC. The evidence at trial clearly 
established that Lupus Lost, over the years, has had income, and that it owned the Bobby 
Lawrence Karate studios. The income received by Lupus Lost is partly charged to Cindy 
Lawrence, as a member and the manager of Hawaiian Investments, LC and PCP, LC, both of 
which were members and owners of Lupus Lost. 
Still, the issue of Cindy Lawrence's wealth remains speculative. In contrast to Victor 
Lawrence, no evidence was presented at trial to clearly establish ongoing or significant income. 
Still, the Court does not believe Cindy Lawrence's claim that she is penniless. 
The lack of clear evidence concerning Cindy Lawrence's wealth does not, however, 
prevent this court from assessing punitive damages against her. In fact, Intermountain is not 
absolutely required to prove her wealth in order to establish a claim for punitive damages, 
provided those damages are less then $100,000 and are not more than 3 times actual damages. 
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fb) Nature of Alleged Conduct, 
Cindy Lawrence, as did Victor Lawrence, conspired with Paul Schwenke and Wayne 
Wong to defraud Intermountain. Her use of the black Rodeo for approximately nine months, all 
the while knowing that Wong had made no payments on the lease, constituted conversion. 
(c) Facts and Circumstances Surrounding such Conduct. 
Cindy Lawrence was a willing participant in the conspiracy to defraud Intermountain. She 
knew about and participated in the offer to pay Wayne Wong $10,000 if he would sign lease 
agreements on three vehicles. She took delivery of the black Rodeo almost immediately after 
Wong signed the agreements. In fact, in answer to interrogatories posed early in the case, she 
identified the black Rodeo as her car. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 83. She, along with other family 
members, enjoyed its use for almost nine months. She knew that she and Victor were not making 
payments on the black Rodeo. The court concludes she knew that Wong also was not making 
payments. 
Cindy, in contrast to Victor's conduct, did not thwart Intermountain's recovery of the 
black Rodeo. It was also Victor, not Cindy, who turned the vehicle over to Paul Schwenke. 
Cindy Lawrence, however, ignored the court's Orders compelling discovery until found 
in contempt, and looking at jail time. In testifying at trial, Ms. Lawrence seemed to have little 
regard for the truth, in that her testimony contradicted statements she had made in her Complaint, 
her sworn statements in answers to interrogatories filed in September, 2001, her sworn testimony 
when deposed in 2002, and even testimony given during trial. 
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(d) Effect of Conduct on the Lives of Others. 
See above comments made with regard to Victor Lawrence and this criterion. 
(e) The Probability of Future Misconduct. 
Cindy Lawrence was involved in the earlier incident with West Valley Dodge. Within a 
month after a Dodge Durango was repossessed from their driveway, Cindy Lawrence willingly 
participated in a scheme to acquire possession of a replacement vehicle, which she, her husband 
and family could drive for free until that vehicle, too, was taken away. 
Cindy Lawrence's purposeful effort to cloak herself in total ignorance, combined with her 
lack of honesty and candor, convinces the court that she is and would be willing to engage in 
future wrongdoing for financial gain - if only she thought she could get away with it, 
Cindy Lawrence also exhibits no regret or remorse for her conduct or the economic losses 
she caused Intermountain. She does not acknowledge that she did anything wrong or improper. 
Any wrongdoing, according to Cindy Lawrence, is someone else's fault. 
One purpose of assessing punitive damages against Cindy Lawrence is to deter her from 
engaging in future similar conduct. This criterion warrants an award of punitive damages. 
(f) Relationship of the Parties. 
See above comments made with regard to Victor Lawrence and this criterion. 
(g) The Amount of Damages Awarded. 
See above comments made with regard to Victor Lawrence and this criterion, 
(h) Award of Punitive Damages. 
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Cindy Lawrence's conduct caused Intermountain to sustain financial damages that, with 
prejudgment interest but exclusive of attorneys fees and court costs, amounted to $138,267.25 as 
of August 13, 2007. The court concludes that punitive damages, to be awarded in favor of 
Intermountain and against Cindy Lawrence, properly should be in the amount $ *fj fj^.^ . 
Wavne Wong 
(a) Relative Wealth of Defendant. 
Wayne Wong's wealth, as measured by income, depends on whether one believes Mr. 
Wong's sworn testimony at trial or representations he made under penalty of perjury in the 
course of a December, 2006 residential loan application. 
If the representations Wong made in a December 2006 residential loan application are 
true, then he had a monthly income of $14,981 and, thus, an annual income of approximately 
$180,000 generated by Ourmart Enterprises, a home based business that he owns. If his 
testimony at trial is to be believed, he makes nothing close to $14,981/month, he does not have 
significant income from Ourmart Enterprises, and he misrepresented his income in December, 
2006 in order to induce a lender to loan him $630,000 with his Stone Canyon Drive home in 
Draper as collateral. Given Wong's contradictory statements and testimony, all under penalty of 
perjury, the Court is inclined to recognize Wong's stated income of $14,981/month, or about 
$180,000 a year, for the purpose of assessing punitive damages. 
Whatever its worth, Mr. Wong owns a business called Ourmart Enterprises. Wong owns 
two homes, although he may be in danger of losing the home at 14104 Stone Canyon Drive. His 
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home in West Jordan presently generates rental income of $1600/month. Based solely on Mr. 
Wong's testimony, the equity in Wong's West Jordan home is about $50,000. 
(b) Nature of the Alleged Conduct. 
Wong engaged in fraudulent conduct. He willingly participated in a scheme to deceive 
and defraud Intermountain in return for promised compensation of $10,000.00. 
(c) Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Conduct. 
As detailed in the previous Findings, Wong signed lease agreements with no intention of 
ever making any of the monthly lease payments. He represented that he would and had insured 
the vehicles, then allowed the insurance to lapse as soon as the vehicles were in others' hands. He 
did not tell Intermountain that other persons, who really would be using the vehicles, had 
promised him $10,000 to use his credit to lease the vehicles in his name. 
As his lease agreements became in default, Wong turned a deaf ear to demands by the 
original lessors, Isuzu Motor Acceptance Corp. and Bank of America, for the return of their 
vehicles. He made no lease payments and recognized no personal obligation to make payments. 
He did not contact Paul Schwenke or Victor Lawrence to request that the leased vehicles be 
surrendered to the lessors, who owned the vehicles. He made no effort to even fmd out who had 
the vehicles or where they were. His only concern seems to have been, whether he would be paid 
the balance of the $10,000 he had been promised. 
(d) Effect of Conduct on the Lives of Others. 
See above comments made with regard to this criterion and Victor Lawrence. 
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(e) Probability of Future Conduct. 
In the course of the second phase of trial, it was quite clearly revealed that Wayne Wong 
has subsequently engaged in substantially similar conduct, in which he defrauded a mortgage 
lender. He participated in a scheme by which he would pose as the purchaser of a home, while 
hiding the fact that someone else was the real owner and would be making the loan payments. 
Wong signed loan documents, intending never to personally make any of the loan payments. In 
fact, he never did. As in this case, he signed whatever documents he was asked to sign, and 
misrepresented (even under penalty of perjury) whatever facts he was asked to misrepresent in 
return for a promise of modest financial gain. 
Mr. Wong's subsequent willing participation in a second scheme to defraud, similar to 
the one perpetrated against Intermountain, including his willingness to act as a "straw man" 
purchaser in return for compensation, quite clearly establishes Wong's propensity and 
willingness to engage in these types of schemes, 
Mr. Wong exhibits no regret or remorse for his conduct or the damages his conduct 
caused Intermountain. Nor does he exhibit any recognition that his deceit and participation in the 
scheme to defraud Intermountain was in any way wrongful. 
A substantial award of punitive damages is appropriate in order to deter, or try to deter 
Mr. Wong from engaging in similar future conduct. 
(f) Relationships of the Parties. 
See above comments made with regard to Victor Lawrence and this criterion. 
(g) The Amount of Damages Awarded. 
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See above comments made with regard to Victor Lawrence and this criterion. 
(h) Other Considerations. 
Mr. Wong's defiance of the Court's Order prohibiting him from conveying interests in 
real property is a factor appropriate to consider in assessing punitive damages. Wong's defiance 
was established by the recently executed and recorded warranty deed that Intermountain 
introduced into evidence. His initial denial of the conveyance, followed by his explanation that 
he dutifully signed the deed only because someone else asked him to, is not an excuse. 
(i) Award of Punitive Damages. 
Wayne Wong's conduct caused Intermountain to sustain financial damages that, with 
prejudgment interest but exclusive of attorneys fees and court costs, amounted to $138,267.25 as 
of August 13,2007. The court concludes that punitive damages, to be awarded in favor of 
Intermountain and against Wayne Wong, properly should be in the amount $ /3#, Z&T-.ZC^ 
JUDGMENT 
The Court supplements the judgment it previously entered as follows: 
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, the Court enters judgment in favor of Intermountain, Inc. 
against Victor Lawrence, Cindy Lawrence, and Wayne Wong as follows: 
L That Intermountain recover of Victor Lawrence punitive damages in the sum of 
$ #f, m> ^ 
2. That Intermountain recover of Cindy Lawrence punitive damages in the sum of 
$ fft Iff.M $>" 
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3. That Intermountain recover of Wayne Wong punitive damages in the sum of 
4. Each defendant's liability for punitive damages is personal and several, and is in 
addition to that defendant's joint and several liability for compensatory damages previously 
awarded by the Court. 
THIRD JUDICAL DISTRIX^COURT 
DATED:M^rZS ,2008. 
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Knute Rife, Esq. 
P.O. Box 2941 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
R. Brent Stephens, Esq. 
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Greg Brelsford, Esq. 
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220 S. 200 E., Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801 364-7188, Fax 801 322-3412 
FAX MEMO 
Date: March 29, 2000 
To: Angel Menedius 
Fax: 801 268-2833 
From: PaulSchwenke 
Pages* 9 including 
Subj: lease financing 
Faxed herewith is a copy of a financing request that we send to Larry Miller Bountiful 
Chrysler Jeep ("LMBCJ") which included the financial statement for the guarantor and 
those of our business. LMBCJ approved financing for 3 vehicles but they were not the 
ones we requested. LMBCJ proposed to lease us 3 Cherokee Sports at down payment 
and payment range were requested. 
Since then, we have seen your company advertised lease specials on Izusu rodeos at 
$299.00 per month without a down payment and Land Rovers Discovery at $399 per 
month with $2000.00 down. 
Please see if we could obtain financing for 2 rodeos and 1 Land Rover. 
We need to make a decision today, so I appreciate if you can expedite this matter. 
Pleasacall me at2§9-166fijf you need any additional information. 
I EXHIBIT , 
ADDENDUM D 
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1 Q. Let me next direct you to Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 15. 
2 Can you identify what that is? 
3 A. It's an application for an employer identification 
4 number by C-Save.net, LC, and it was submitted to Intermountain. 
5 Q. Was this found in Intermountain's business records? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Where? 
8 A. In the deal jackets. 
9 MR. FISHBURN: I'd move to admit Plaintiff's Exhibit 
10 No. 15. 
11 THE COURT: Plaintiff's 15 will be admitted. 
12 (Exhibit No. 15 received into evidence) 
13 Q. BY MR. FISHBURN: Let me direct your attention next to 
14 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16. Can you identify what that is, 
15 please? 
16 A. It's a three-page credit bureau report on Wayne Wong run 
17 by Intermountain. 
18 Q. Where was this record located? 
19 A. In the deal jacket. 
20 MR. FISHBURN: I move to — that Plaintiff's Exhibit 
21 No. 16 be received. 
22 THE COURT: Plaintiff's 16 will be received. 
23 (Exhibit No. 16 received into evidence). 
24 Q. BY MR. FISHBURN: Mr. Wadkins, why would Intermountain 
25 have obtained a credit bureau report on Mr. Wong? 
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1 wasn't like it was the only form of transportation. 
2 Q. Okay. At the time that the vehicle was leased, at least 
3 initially, you regarded this — this was — you understood this 
4 was going to be your car; is that right? 
5 A. Well, it was a nice gesture, but I knew it would not be 
6 my vehicle, no. 
7 Q. Why is it that you — you smile and you say, "I knew it 
8 wouldn't be mine." 
9 A. Because — well, I don't know how your family is, but we 
10 share everything, so — 
11 Q. All right. Well, where did you get the understanding 
12 initially — whether or not you really believed it was going to 
13 happen — that it would be your car? 
14 A. Because I think Victor wanted to do something nice for 
15 me, but I don't -- you know, I mean — 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. If I say I made him dinner, it's for everybody. 
18 Q. All right. Did Victor tell you that this was to be your 
19 car? 
20 A. He said it was a car for the family. He said it was a 
21 Paul Schwenke trying to compensate for work that he had done. 
22 Q. That Victor had done for Paul? 
23 A. Right. 
2 4 Q. Let me have you, Cindy, now look at Plaintiff's Exhibit 
25 No. 31, please. 
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1 A. This is not easy to negotiate. 
2 Q. Yeah, it' s not. 
3 THE COURT: I'm sorry, but the exhibit again? 
4 MR. FISHBURN: No. 31. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. 
6 MR. FISHBURN: That would be the original — 
7 THE COURT: The complaint. 
8 MR. FISHBURN: — plaintiff's verified complaint. 
9 Q. BY MR. FISHBURN: Have you seen this document before? 
10 Are you familiar with it? 
11 A. I'm not. 
12 Q. To the best of your knowledge, have you not seen it? 
13 A. To the best of my knowledge, I haven't. 
14 Q. All right. By reference, this is the verified complaint 
15 that started this lawsuit, and I think it's dated May 24th of 
16 200Q. It is. Now let me direct your attention to paragraphs 34 
17 and 35. In those two paragraphs there are references to, quote, 
18 "Cindy Lawrence's car," end of quote. Do you see those? 
19 A. Uh-huh. 
20 Q. Now did you — at the date this complaint was filed, 
21 which is May 24th of 2000, did you conceive that there was one of 
22 these vehicles that was Cindy Lawrence's car? 
23 A. No. I never thought it was just my car. I think Paul 
24 Schwenke's idea -- the whole initial idea that it was my car was 
25 Paul Schwenke thinking, "Cindy's probably really ticked off at 
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1 Victor because he's done a lot of work for me and I haven't paid 
2 him, so we're going to do this and appease this woman." 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. That's what I think it was. So no, I never thought it 
5 was my car. He never thought it was just my car. It was a gift. 
6 Q. Incidentally, this complaint says that Mr. Johnson is 
7 the attorney for the plaintiffs. Do you see that on the first 
8 page? 
9 A. On the — back t o t he f i r s t page? 
10 Q. Yes. 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Did you retain Mr. Johnson to represent you in this 
13 case? 
14 A. No, I did not. I think that Victor may spoken with him 
15 to do that. I didn't deal with any of this. Victor did all the 
16 dealings with finances and all this legal stuff. I don't think 
17 he wanted me upset in this. 
18 Q. Do you recall before this complaint was filed reading 
19 the complaint to give your input or — 
20 A. No, I did not. 
21 Q. T h a t ' s a d e f i n i t e no, you did no t? 
22 A. Yes. I d id n o t . 
23 Q. All right. Did you know it had been filed — at the 
24 time did you know it had been filed on your behalf? 




























once, but during the time period that the black Rodeo 









No, I was not. 
Was Victor making any lease payments on it? 
I don't know. 
Did you even know who the lessee was? 
No. 
Did you have an assumption as to who the lessee was? 
Not any at all. I was to the understanding that it 




That's all that I was told. 
All right. The basis for that understanding was what? 
The basis to that is that he owed Victor a bundle of 
money because Victor had done a lot of work for him, and in order 







could use through the company. 
Okay. Paul told you that; is that right? 
No. 
Oh, who told you that? 
Victor did. 
Okay. Let me direct your attention next, if you will, 




And I apologize, we have to turn through these pages. 
-208-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE WONG, et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BANK OF AMERICA NA, et al, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 000904217 MI 
(Volume II) 
Bench Trial 
Electronically Recorded on 
June 5, 2007 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Knute A. Rife 
HOLLAND & HART 
60 E. South Temple #2000 




210 N. 1200 E. #200 
Lehi, UT 84043 
Telephone: (801)331-7300 
P. Bryan Fishburn 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES 
4505 S. Wasatch Blve. #215 
SLC, UT 84124 
Telephone: (801)277-34 45 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-2927 
-220-
1 A. Their understanding or my understanding from the 
2 conversation I had with them was that C-Save.net was entering 
3 this lease — these leases, and Wayne Wong was simply the 
4 personal guarantor. My understanding was at some point later 
5 that after the leases were signed, I had been told that they were 
6 signed in blank. 
7 Q. Okay. What strategy did you disagree with? 
8 A. Well, I disagree with anytime anybody signs something in 
9 blank, number one, when they had done that. Then No. 2, when 
10 they brought Wilma and Tonya and Cindy into the picture, it was 
11 like, "No, wait a minute. They said Wayne signed these. Wayne's 
12 the one that's been defrauded here. It was supposed to be in the 
13 name of C-Save.net." 
14 Q. Okay. Now do you believe that — did you tell your 
15 wife, Cindy, that — at about this time that a lawsuit had been 
16 filed in her name? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Did you tell Wayne Wong that a lawsuit had been filed in 
19 his name? 
20 A, I don't know if I told him or if he was there. He 
21 was — he spent a lot of time, like he said, up at C-Save doing a 
22 lot of the work trying to get that off the ground. 
23 Q. Okay. Now on the very day that this lawsuit was filed 
24 you and Cindy had possession of the black Rodeo; is that right? 
25 A. I had possession until I think that January 31st date, 
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1 A. I knew Wayne Wong was being alleged to be the one that 
2 had signed the leases as his own vehicles. My understanding was 
3 it was C-Save's vehicle. 
4 Q. According to the complaint, it was Wayne Wong who had 
5 leased the vehicles, correct? 
6 A. Okay. My understanding it was C-Save's vehicle. If 
7 you're asking for what my understanding was, my understanding was 
8 that that vehicle and Wilma's vehicle were all C-Save's vehicles. 
9 Tonya's vehicle, Tonya was supposed to make the payments for it. 
10 Q. Let me ask you this, at this point in time based on your 
11 knowledge of the complaint and whatever else had happened in the 
12 months since, who did you understand was the owner of the 
13 vehicle? 
14 A. At what point in time? 
15 Q. January 31st, 2001. 
16 A. January 31st of 2001 I thought that there was a leaser 
17 relationship, and I didn't know who the leaser was because there 
18 were like seven different entities — Bank of America, Isuzu and 
19 Intermountain — and I thought the leasee was rightfully C-
20 Save.net. 
21 Q. Okay. Now on June 4th, 2001 — that's after this 
22 repossession attempt — you entered an appearance on behalf of 
23 all of the original plaintiffs in this case, correct? 
24 A. Yes, sir. 
25 Q. And you also entered an appearance for yourself because 
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1 Cindy's car. One is Wilma's car. One is Tonya's car." The 
2 answers to interrogatories several months later, they were still 
3 identified the same way. They're still being identified as 
4 Tonya, Wilma and Cindy's cars. 
5 Cindy testified that yes, she understood she was 
6 getting a car. Now Tonya and Wilma aren't here, so it's 
7 somewhat irrelevant. She didn't understand — she didn't 
8 contemplate that she would be making any of the payments. So she 
9 was participating in it knowing that she was going to be getting 
10 a car, but not disclosing — omitting to disclose that somebody 
11 else was going to be making the payments other than the lessee. 
12 There is also a conspiring to defraud where one assists 
13 one to perpetrate the fraudulent scheme, and that really goes 
14 more to Victor than it does to Cindy. We'll concede that fact. 
15 Mr. Lawrence has attempted to persuade the Court that he 
16 was totally uninvolved in the negotiations. Well, according to 
17 Mr. Schwenke, that's not true. I believe the evidence was that 
18 he made the down payment on the deal, so certainly he was 
19 involved then. 
20 Although he is not the Counsel of record, he signed the 
21 complaint, so he knew at that point — and I'm going to probably 
22 cross over to conversion here in a minute. He knew that the 
23 lessee was Wayne Wong because the complaint characterizes Wayne 
24 Wong as signing the leases. From that point on he and his wife 
25 had use of the car. 
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No, I did not. 
Did you feel you ever entered into an attorney/client 




When this case was initiated, did you know that there 












I knew there was something. 
How did you know that? 
From Victor. 
Did you know that you were a party in this case9 
No, I didn't. 
Did you authorize a complaint to be filed on your 
No, I did not. 
Did Jamis Johnson ever contact you about the case9 
Never. 
Did he ever — did Jamis Johnson ever ask your input in 
answering any of the discovery in this case7 
A. 
Q. 
No, I never spoke to him about this case. 
Did you instruct him on how to answer m any way any of 





Now when you visited Intermountam on the or] gmal date 
went and looked at the vehicles, did you negotiate the 
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1 lease deal with Intermountain? 
2 A. No. 
3 I Q. What do you believe negotiate means? 
4 A. Deciding the final price. 
5 I Q. Do you believe asking questions about what prices are is 
6 negotiation? 
7 A, No, 
8 Q. Do you believe that looking at cars is negotiation? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Did you enter the building on Intermountain's lot on the 
11 date that you visited Intermountain? 
12 A. No. I stood in the parking lot. 
13 Q. Do you know who Wayne Wong is today? 
14 A. Yes, I do. 
15 Q. Now did you know who Wayne Wong was on the day that you 
16 visited Intermountain? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Did you know who Wayne Wong was when the complaint was 
19 filed in this case? 
20 A. No, I did not. 
21 Q. Did you know him when the interrogatories were filed in 
22 this case? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. When did you finally meet Mr. Wong? 
25 A. I met — the first time that I ever met him or saw 
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1 Q Do you remember being asked whether or not you ratified 
2 the allegations m the complaint9 
3 A. I don't remember being asked that, no. 
4 Q. You have ratified them, is that — 
5 A. What does ratified mean7 
6 Q. It means you've accepted them as being yours Do you 
7 remember doing that9 
8 A. No, I don't, but if I did — I'm not saying that I 
9 didn't, but — 
10 Q. Okay. Let me direct your attention to page 48. 
11 A, I'm there. 
12 Q. Okay. I'd like you to go down to line 21. 
13 A. Okay. 
14 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, I'll represent to the Court 
15 that these were questions asked of Ms. Lawrence by Paul Schwenke, 
16 who was attending. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 Q. BY MR, FISHBURN* Question: 
19 Q. So even though you have never seen 
20 this complaint before as testified, this would 
21 have been the cause of action you would have 
22 asserted and m fact would have supported and 
23 consented for, is that correct9 
24 Your answer9 
25 A Yes. 
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1 fraudulent scheme to set forth a situation, provide a plausible 
2 excuse as to why these people could continue to drive the 
3 vehicles for free forever, despite demands, despite discovery, 
4 despite orders of the Court. There has been a perpetration of 
5 the fraud throughout the proceedings, using the proceedings, 
6 using the judicial process to hide the vehicles and make it more 
7 and more difficult. 
8 Now Intermountain did not expressly plead aiding and 
9 abetting fraud. To that extent I would move under Rule 15(b) 
10 that the pleadings of Intermountain be amended to conform to the 
11 evidence in this case, because the evidence clearly indicates and 
12 supports a cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud against 
13 Victor Lawrence, if it's not conspiracy to defraud and if it's 
14 not direct overt fraud, which I think the evidence also supports. 
15 Now I do need to direct the Court's attention to the 
16 case of Carols vs. Sabey, which is an appellate case, Utah 2003 
17 Utah Appellate 339, because in that case the Court of Appeals 
18 simply said, "We're asked to decide if Utah has ever recognized 
19 a cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud, and we're not 
20 going to decide that." What the Court said was, "You know, under 
21 this case plaintiff couldn't prove it anyway, so we're going to 
22 sidestep that." 
23 But I think that Utah would recognize aiding and 
24 abetting fraud, first of all, because the Schwartz case indicates 
25 that the liability of a person can be based vicariously, even 
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1 So I guess what I am asking is if the — I would hope 
2 the Court finds that both Cindy and Victor Lawrence were overt 
3 participants in the fraud, but an alternative finding that even 
4 if Victor Lawrence did not overtly participate in the fraud, he 
5 very clearly aided and abetted it, and therefore would be liable 
6 in any event, which is what I'm asking. 
7 I Then of course we would ask for the damages. We ask 
8 for punitive damages against Victor and Cindy Lawrence under the 
9 standard of Section 18-1-1. Of course, the law does provide that 
10 if there is a finding of punitive damages, we would have to take 
11 a bit more testimony on wealth and assets and earnings. That 
12 hasn't been gone into. That would be very short. It could be 
13 done either today or it could be later — again, premised on the 
14 Court first making the finding that the punitive damages are 
15 warranted. 
16 We only have, incidentally, one exhibit that goes to 
17 that issue that's been marked, and that's the papers filed in 
18 Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence's divorce, which address the assets that 
19 they had. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Who's going next? 
21 MR. BURRIDGE: If there's one thing about the evidence 
22 in this case, your Honor, it is not clear. It's been said from 
23 the very beginning this has been a convoluted case. Counsel in 
24 this case hasn't always understood exactly what has been going 
25 on. 
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ADDENDUM F 
ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST IN LEASES 
AND LEASED VEHICLES 
This ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST IN LEASES AND LEASED VEHICLES is entered into this 
31s1 day of January, 2001 by BANK OF AMEHCA, NLA. CSo/A ") in favor of II^TTERMOUNTAIN, 
INC., dba Intennountain Tsuzu. 
WHEREAS, on or about March 31,2000, Intermountain^ Inc., as Lessor (the "Dealer ") 
and Mr. Wayne Wong, as Lessee (the "Lessee "), entered into a Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement,, 
No. 10-1371-06441 (the "Lease Agreement9') for the lease to Lessee of anew 2000 Isuru Rodeo 
LS, VJN 4S2DMS8W7Y4302440 {"Vehicle No. 3," sometimes referred to herein as the "Leased 
Vehicle"), and 
WHEREAS pursuant to its terms the Lease Agreement was assigned by the Dealer to 
BofA or its successors or assigns and payment was made therefor by BofA to the Dealer; and 
WHEREAS disputes have arisen between the Lessee (as well as various third parties in 
possession of the Leased Vehicle), and the Dealer with respect to the validity of specific 
provisions of the Lease Agreement and the obligation of Mr. Wong to make the lease payments 
required under the Lease Agreement; and 
WHEREAS a civil action has been filed by Lessee and certain third parties, entitled 
Wilma L Sckwenke, TaniaP. Schwenke, Cindy Lawrence and Wayne Wangy. Intermountain, 
lnc.t Bank of America, N.A. et ah, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Stale 
of Utah as Civil No. 000904217 (the "Civil Action 1 , contesting the validity of the Lease 
Agreement and the Lessee's obligations thereunder; and 
WHEREAS BofA has made demand on the Dealer to indemnify and hold BofA harmless 
from all allegations and expenses of the Civil Action, pursuant to the provisions of the Dealer 
Agreement entered into by and between the Dealer and BofA; and 
WHEREAS, the Dealer has agreed to repurchase the Lease Agreement and all interest 
therein, as well as in the Leased Vehicle, from BofA ift return for an assignment by BofA to the 
Dealer of all of BofA's right, title and interest in the Lease Agreement and the Leased Vehicle, 
and the parties are desirous to enter into such transaction; 
NOW THEREFORE, based on the foregoing recitals and for good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which is hereby acknowledged by the respective 
parties, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Assignment of Interest in Lease Agreements and Leased Vehicles, BofA, for 
valuable consideration received from the Dealer, hereby assigns to the Dealer all of its right, title 
and interest in the Lease Agreement (including the right to receive attorneys* fees) and the 
Leased Vehicle, in an uas is" condition, without representation, warranty or recourse of any kind. 
BofA also assigns all of its rights as an insured or loss payee under a contract of insurance, if 
any, covering the Leased Vehicle. 
-1-
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2. Defense and Indemnification of BofA in the Civil Action. The Dealer hereby 
represents and warrants that it will, at its own expense, undertake and defend the interests of 
BofA in the Civil Action, and based on this Assignment, will use its best fiaith efforts to obtain an 
order of the Court dismissing BofA from the Civil Action with prejudice. The Dealer further 
agrees to indemnify and hold BofA completely harmless from and against any expenses of the 
Civil Action and any judgment which may be entered against BofA in the Civil Action. 
3. Further Actions to be Taken. The parties hereby agree to cooperate with on 
another in good faith in taking such fiirther actions as may be necessary to effectuate the terms of 
this Assignment, including the transfer of title to the Leased Vehicle from BofA to the Dealer, 
4. Full Satisfaction. BofA agrees and accepts (i) payment in the amount set forth in 
Exhibit A hereto, and (ii) the indemnity and other obligations of the Dealer set forth herein, in 
ftdl satisfaction of (a) the recourse/repurchase claim of BofA against the Dealer and (b) all 
liabilities of the Dealer to BofA under the terms of the Lease Agreement and the Dealer 
Agreement, insofar as such matters relate to the Civil Action. 
DATED the first date written above. 
For BOFA: 
Bank of America, 2V.A* 
s-y, 
For the Dealer: 
Itttermountaitt, Inc., dba Intermountain Isuzu 
By: N ^ y j ^ 3 — — - •^ KV/^ Bv t^lAG 
Its: V/P 
JAN 30 2001 10:47 
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ASSIGNMENT OF I N T E N T IN LEASES 
AND LEASED VEHICLES 
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TO: Pend 
Bank or America, N.A. 
P«r (602) 441-7415 < * « - *** •" ^ 5 7 
FROM: 
PATE: January 30.2001 
FAQES* CUENT^ATTER Bank of America 
MESSAGE: Pro transmitting ihc Assignment Agreement we discussed yesterday, together widi a copy 
of the check we received from the dealer. Kindly sign this freed copy and return it ro mo 
via fax so the Dealer can initiate repossession proceedings for the vehicle today. I will 
send the hard copy of the agreement to you for signature and return. I will send the 
check, and a copy of the agreement, to Pcllic Brown. Many thanks. Bob Alsop 
TELECOPY OPERATOR: 
FACSIMILE 
CONFIDENTIAL: fnformmion canltlntd In tnls UcaimlU may 
eortetiiuti coftHdtntiti »nd prlvllngeti e«mmunlc«Uon, it to 
not tntend«W for frbnamisslon \o, or r#e»(pc by, any 
unmmharlzmd ptrvana If roc»)v«d In Trot pJo*»» natlly in* 
•#ns«r fmm«dUi«(y. 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorney^ & Counselors al Law 
111 Ea*i Broadway. Su>lo 9oo 
Sail Lafca City, Utfih 94711 
Telephone B01 <i5-3000 
facsimile 5,01 415-3500 
JfiN 30 2301 10:46 
1 801 41S 3500 PRGE.01 
ADDENDUM G 
Capitalized Cost Reduction 
Capitalized cost reduction and payment period requirements should be competitive*-
and consistent with sound business practices, but will vary depending upon the type 
of vehicle to be financed, the customer's credit worthiness, and other considerations. 
Capitalized cost reduction means cash or cash equivalent that a customer actually
 UCt 
pays to the Dealer at the time the lease is consummated, If a rebate is included in d~~ 
the capitalized cost reduction, the rebate must first have been disclosed on the credit ^ 
application and must be fully disclosed as a rebate on the lease agreement. IMAC will 
furnish minimum acceptability requirements to the Dealer from time to time. 
Lease Payments 
Except under special circumstances, the customer's payment should be scheduled at 
monthly intervals. The first payment date should be one month from the date of the 
lease agreement. This date can be adjusted to coincide with, the date on which the 
customer receives personal income but may not exceed 30 days-
Vehicle Insurance 
The IMAC Lease Program requires that customers provide, at their own expense, 
acceptable vehicle insurance> including liability collision, comprehensive, fire, theft, 
and combined additional coverage, with or without deductibles, dining the entire 
term of the lease. 
It is essential that the vehicle be insured from the moment it is delivered to the 
customer. Each lease agreement submitted to IMAC must be accompanied by written 
evidence that the vehicle is covered by an acceptable existing policy and that IMAC 
has been named as an additional insured and loss payee. Dealer is responsible for 
obtaining and verifying accurate and complete information-
Lease Terms and Conditions 
Lease Term - The term of any lease shall be at least 24 months, but shall not exceed 
60 months* IMAC also offers customized terms in three month intervals, for example, 
27 months, 30 months and 33 months. 
Residual Values - Residual Values will be specified periodically by IMAC, 
Mileage - Standard Mileage limits are 15,000 miles per year (1,250 miles per month) 
but other mileage limits will he available from time to time. 
Security Deposit - A security deposit is required, unless specified otherwise. 
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